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SUITE !!>01 MUTUAL BUILDING 
October 13, 1947. 
Hon. Ee VT. Hudgins, Chie.f _Justice 
~upr.eme Court - of Appeals of Virginia 
Richmond, Virginia 
Re: Rosa.lie H. Schwarz·schild et als., 
Plaintiffs in error vs. 
Myrtle A. Welborne, Defendant in Error. R.3230 
My dear Judge: 
I wish to add to the authorities referred to in 
my brief on behalf of the Defendant in Error the following:-
Hunt vs. Held, 90 Ohio State 280, 107 N.E. 765. 
In this case the Court said as follows:-
"But is there any doubt as to the meaning of the 
words? The words 'residence,' as we view it, is equivalent 
to 'residential' and was used in contradistinction to 
'business.' If a building is used as a place of abode and 
no business carried on, it would be used for residence pur-
poses only, whether occupied by one family or a number of 
families. Counsel say that the words were intended to 
_ describe a type of building. We think not. The word 
(residence' has reference to the use or mode of occupancy 
to which the building may be put. If it had been intended 
that the building was to be for the use of one family only, 
words indicating such an intention would have been used, as 
is frequently done, such as 'a single residence,' a 'private 
residence,' 'a single dwelling house.'" 
Also the case of Hutchinson v. Ulrich, 145 Ill. 336, 
34 N.E. 556, 21 L.R.A. 391, where the Court said in part:-
"The intention of the parties must be determined. _____ -----.--. 
from the language of the deed itself, considered in con-
nection with the surrounding circumstances at the time 
the deed was executed. Only a single dwelling is to be 
constructed or placed upon each 50-foot lot. Does the 
word 'single' apply to the building or the use which 
should be made of the building when constructed? The 
question is one which is not entirely free from doubt, 
but we are inclined to the opinion that the word 'single' 
refers to the structure. The word 'single' signifies 
one building." 
Opposing counsel has been previously notiried of 
,, 
A...--_:. __ ... 
these- two cases and that I expected to re:f'er to thein 
in my argument. , · 
truly, 
~b!l)~ 
~...._"41:L, s E. Maurice. . 
CEM:,I\'I 
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IN THE 
Sup~eme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 3230 
ROSALIE H. SCHW ARZSCHILD, ET AL., Appellants, 
versus 
MYRTLE A. WELBORNE, Appellce. 
PETITION FOR APPl~JAL. 
To the Honorable Chief Just-ice and .A.s.cwciate .J u.~ticPs of tlui 
Supreme Court of Appeal.~ of Yirginia: 
Your petitioners, Rosalie H. Schwarzschilcl, Thomas B. 
Gay, Anna B. Boykin and Lee Paschall, respectfully repre-
sent that they arc ag·grieved by a final dec1'ee entered by tbt-' 
.Judge of the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond 
on September 26, 1946, whereby said Court refused to ell·· 
force certain restrictive covenants. against the defendant, 
Myrtle A. Welborne, and dismissed your petitioners' bill of 
eomplaint in a suit in which your petitioners wore plaintiffs 
and Myrtle A. W elborne was the defendant. A transcript 
of the record of said suit is presented with this petition, from 
which the following facts will appear. 
2* *STATEMENT OF F AC'rs. 
The parties will be referred to in the positi011s which they 
occupied in the lower court, tbe petitioners hcing· plaintiffs 
and respondent the defendant. 
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By deed dated February 12, 1912, and duly recorded in the 
Clerk's Office of the Chancery Court of the City of Rich-
mond, Virginia, in Deed Book 214-A, page 463, John P. 
Branch conveyed the lot now owned .by the defendant to Ar-
t.hur L. Straus and this deed contains the f~llowing restric-
t.ions which the said Arthur L. Straus, by joining in said 
deed, bound himself, his heirs, devisees, executors, adminis-
trators, personal representatives and assig-ns to observe: 
"It is covenanted and agreed by the party of the second 
pn rt that no part of the said land shall be sold, leased or 
otherwise disposed of at any time hereafter to any person 
who ii;; a negTo or of African descent. 
"It is further covenanted and agreed that when the said 
land is improved by the said party of the second part or his 
exe_cutors, administrators, heirs, devisees or assigns, there 
l4hall not be erected more than two (2) dwellings thereon, 
and. that the said dwelling or dwellings shall be erected in 
eouformity with the building line as already established by 
the house now at the corner of Mulberrv Street and Monu-
ment Avenue, which building line is twenty feet (20') distant 
r l'Om the north line of Monument A venue, meaning thereby 
thut the furthest projection (not including open porch or 
11ecessary steps of any building·) shall not be nearer than 
twenty feet (20') to the north line of Monument Avenue, and 
that a strip of land not less tlian five feet ( 5') wide on the 
oa~t side of the most eastern of said dwellings, and a strip 
of land, not less than five feet ( 5') wide on the west side of 
the most w·estern of said dwellings, and a strip of land not 
less than ten feet (10') ·wide between the two said dwell-
:~~{, ings are to be left vacant, with *the privileg·e to the party 
of the second part or assigns of building one (1) dwell-
i 11g· on said lot and of leaving greater strips of laud unim-
! ,roved on the east and west sides of said dwelling. 
'' The party of tbe second part covenants and agrees tliat 
if the said land iR improved, such improvements shall be a 
,[welling or two dwellings, and that each dwelling shall ·be 
expensive as tlw adjoining dwelling· ( on the east) on this 
block, whicl1 covenants and restrictions are accepted as part 
of the considerations of this deed and are to run with the 
land. · 
"The party of the first part covenants and agrees that in 
;-;elling the land on the "'."est he will place thereon a restric-
tion as to the same building· lines and the vacancy of the five 
fo<.lt (5') .immediately adjoining· oil tl1e west the above de-
:.;eribed land, but not restricting as to the size of the lots on 
the west of the said land conveyed by this deed. 
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~' * * * (English covenants.) 
, 
'' The party of the second part accepts the conditions of 
this deed and by joining fo these presents hereby binds him-
self, his heirs, devisees, executors, administrators, personal 
representatives and assig·ns forever."· . · 
By successive conveyances this property came into the 
hands of the defendant, Myrtle A. Welborne, the last convey-
ance b.eing· from Frances A. Swink, a widow, dated Dceeinbcr 
4, 1944 (R., p. 3). 
About one month after her purchase of this property, Mrs. 
Welborne had alterations made in the house to make it suit-
·able _for the operation of, a boarding house or hotel, and ap-
plied to and obtained a permit from the Commissioner of 
Buildings of the City of Richmond to occupy the premises 
as a boarding house as defined by the zoning ordinance of the 
City of Richmond. The following is the definition of a 
4 * *boarding house contained in Sec. 1, Art. 1, Chap. 57 of 
the Richmond City Code of 1937, as amended May 19, 
1943: 
"Boarding House-A dwelling other than a hotel where 
for compensation, meals, or lodg'ing and meals, a re provided 
for four or more persons.'' (R., pp. 14-15.) 
The defendant applied to and obtained from the Commis-
sioner of Revenue of the City of Richmond a license to op-
erate her house during the year 1945 as '' a hotel'' of twelve 
rooms and seven baths. This license was granted under Sec. 
102 of Chap. 10 of the Richmond City Code, which reads as 
follows: 
"102. HOTELS-Any person, firm or corporation who 
keeps a public inn or lodging house of mo1~e than ten bed-
rooms where transient guests are feel or lodged for pay in 
the city of Richmond shall be deemed to be engaged in the 
business of keeping a hotel. A transient .g·uest is one who 
puts up for less than a week at .such hotel, but such a house 
is no less a hotel because some of its guests put up for longer 
periods than one week. Every person, firm or corporation 
conducting the business of keeping a hotel as defined in this 
section shall pay an annual license tax of $2.00 for each bed-
room in such hotel.'' 
'In addition to the above, the c.Jefendant advertised in the 
4 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
' 
newspapers of the City of Richmond under the classified ad-
vertisements· '' Rooms with Meals 99'' as follows: 
''MONUMENT AVE. An ideal h·ome for those away from 
the comforts of' their own. Room with or without bath. Mea]s 
that satisfy. 4-3300." ~R., p. 15.} 
It is admitted by the defendant that since ,January 5, 1945, 
she has conducted the business of renting rooms in her l1ouse 
to others :as is stated in paragraph· seven of her answer, and 
that she has since January 5; 1945, served meals to persons 
renting rooms at her house. She states that she •is not 
5* serving· meals at present to such persons but claims the 
right to do so in the future (R., p. 16). 
As soon as the other residents in tbe block in which Mrs. 
Welborne lives discovered the purpose to which she intended 
to put her house they protested to her, and these protests 
being of no avail, they instituted tlie present suit ag·ainst 
her for the purpose of onf orcing the restrictive covenants 
set forth above. In an effort to reduce the record as 1m:ch 
as possible, a stipulation of the issue and facts to be consid-
ered by the court was entered into by counsel for both sides. 
The issue is stated as follows in tl1e stipulation: 
''1. That the sole question to be determined in this cause 
is whether the defendant's use and occupancy of the prem-
ises No. 2708 Monument A venue, Richmond, Virginia, con-
stitute a violation of the terms of the restrictive covenants sot 
forth in paragraph five of the bill of complaint., by which it 
is agreed the defendant is bound uules.s (a} the complainants 
are estopped by their conduct from enforcing· the same, or 
(b} there has been such a general chang·e in tl1e neighborhood 
as to render it inequitable to enforce the same; 
'' That if said use and occupancy do constitute such a vio-
lation, 1 complainants are entitled to an .injunction again~t 
the defendant on the grounds alleged and as prayed in their 
bill; 
''That if said use and occupancy do not constitute such a 
violation, complainants' bill should be dismissed'' (R., p. 13). 
After hearing argument of the case, the Judge of the lower 
court rendered an opinion in which he held that Mrs. ,vel-
borne was bound by. the restrictions set forth above; that 
the neighborhood had not so changed as to render it inequit-
able to enforce the covenants, and that the plaintiffs 
6* *had not forfeited any of their rights by failing to ob-
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ject to the zoning ordinance which had been passed since 
the restrictions were placed on the property. However, the 
court declined to enjoin the def end ant on the ground that 
the restrictive covenants quoted above limited only the type 
of building but not the use to which it mig·ht be put, the court 
apparently holding that the building in which Mrs. Welborne 
was running a boarding house or hotel was none-the-less a 
dwelling· house because it had been built as such; that Mrs. 
,v elborne 's activities could be brought· within the covenants 
only by implication, which the court was unwilling to do; that 
the complainants had not shown that they would suffer any 
damag·e from the defendant's violation of the covenants; and 
that upon balancing the conveniences it would be inequitable 
to enforce the restrictions against :Mrs. W elborne, assuming 
that she was violating· them. In his opinion the Judge of the 
lower court considered the cases of Whitel1Atrst v,. BU'rgess, 
130 Va. 572, and Deitrick v • .Leadbetter, 175 Va. 170, an<l: held 
that they were not controlling in the case at bar (R., pp. 35-
54). 
We propose to show to the Court that the lower court erred 
in its construction of the restrictions and that the case at 
bar falls so well within the principles enunciated in the 
\Vhitehurst and Deitrick cases above that if the judg111ent of 
the lower court in this case is affirmed it will result in over-
ruling· the Whitehurst and Deitrick cases. 
7* * ASSIGN)'IENTS OF ERROR. 
1. The lower court erred in holding that the restrietive 
covenants do not limit the use to which the defendant's prem-
ises may be put. , 
2. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant has 
not violated the restrictive covenants on her property. 
3. The lower court erred in refusing to enforce the restric-
tive covenants against the defendant. 
ARGUMENT. 
I. '1.1he lower court errecl in hold-ing that the restrictfoe 
covenants do not limit the use to 'Which the defendant's prem.-
ises may be put. 
The pertinent portion of the restrictions on the defend- · 
ant's property is as follows (R., pp. 3, 4) : 
''It is further covenanted and agreed tl1at when the said 
land is improved by the said party of the second part, or his 
6 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
executors, administrators, heirs, devisees or assigns, there 
shall not be erected more than two (2) dwellings thereon 
>II- ~ ((c " 
And further : 
"The party of the second part covenants and agrees that 
if the said land is j.mproved, such improvements shall be a 
dwelling or two dwellings • • • . '' 
In the case of Whitehurst v. Burgess, 130 Va. 572, the re-
strictive covenant was as follows: 
" 'That two adjoining- lots will constitute a building· site 
for one residence only, except on Surrey crescent and At-
lantic boulevard, south of Hanover A.venue, where four ad-
joining lots will constitute a building site for one residence 
only, and on Westmoreland and Buckingham avenues, where 
three adjoining lots will constitute a building· site for one 
residence only.' '' 
8* •It will be noted that the restriction contains no lan-
guage speci~cally restricting the 1tse of the property, 
and in· this respect is identical with the problem presented in 
the instant case. The court in the .Whitehurst case, after 
considering tlie restrictions, stated that the language used 
in the restriction created a residential district and that "bv 
i.nevitable implication it excludes any other use of the prop-
erty~'. (Italics supplied.) . This construction is in accord 
with the general law. 
,In the case of Stra:uss v. Ginzberg, 15 N. S. (2d) Minn. 130, 
the restriction was as follows: 
'' This conveyance is made upon the following conditions 
only: That when the premises herein contained are improved 
it shall be by the erection of one new residence building· cost-· 
ing not less than $4,000.00. '' 
The defendant wished to alter his residence for the pur-
pose of conducting religious worship for a religious organi-
zation and the neig·hbors brought suit to enforce the restric-
tive covenants against him. The court in that case adopted 
· t.he language of 26 Corpus Juris Secundum, Deeds, p. 164, 
sub-sec. a, as 'follows: 
'' 'A. restrictive coveirnnt against the· erection of certain 
\_ 
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'types of building· limits the usett as well as the construction of 
the building. ' '' 
And also the language of 14 Ame1~ica11 Jurisprudence, Cove-
nants, Conditions and Restrictions, p. 264, as follows-: 
''A covenant against any building except a 'dwelling 
house', or 'one dwelling house', a 'single dwelling', or a 
"'dwelling' is generally interpreted to forbid the erection of 
any building except one designated for a single family; 
9* ,a. 9 * Such a restriction defines the use *to which tbc 
dwelling shall be put, and not simply its form * * ;r. ." 
The co11rt further gave its own reasoning· .on this point as 
· follows! 
'' In the instant case, th~ wording of the restdction goe~ 
to the construction of the building· to be placed on the lot. It 
would be unreasonable to say that it does not also cover its 
nse. If, after a residence has been constructed on a lot with 
a restrictive covenant in the deed, the-owner could thereafter 
use the building for a millinery store, restaurant, beauty shop, 
antique shop, or numerous other uses to which, but for the 
prohibitions in a zoning ordinance, 'it would be· suitable and 
available, the covenant would be of little value and the gen-
- eral plan of restriction, which. would otherwise inure to the 
benefit of all purchasers, would be circumvented." 
The court in the Strauss case enforced the restrictions 
against the defendant even though subsequent to the placing 
of restrictions on the property there had been adopted a gen-
eral zoning ordinance which would have otherwise allowed 
the use which the defendant wished to make of his prop-
erty. 
In the case of Boh1Jn v. Rogoff, 239 N. vV. (Mich.) 320, the 
conrt said! · 
'' 'It avails defendants nothing to contend that the restric-·· 
tion applies only to the kind of buildings to be erecte·a, and 
not to the use of the property. This contention runs counter 
to the manifest intent of the restriction, and would fritter 
away its benefit.' " 
We find further in 14 Am. Jur., Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions, p. 243, this statement: 
g Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
'' s:t ~ • A co-venant to build a house of a certain kind has: 
been held to lJe violated by the conversion of a structure· al-
ready built according to the covenant into one that violates 
it.'' 
10* . ""In the cas-e of Powe·1·s v. RdJdding1 113 N. E. (Mass.) 
782,. the court said that a restriction that ''but one dwell- · 
ing house shall be erected'' upon the premises involved de--
fined the use to which that building· should be put and not 
merely the £orm of the structure. 
The above law coincides so closely with connnon -sense tlm t 
it would seem that no argument of it is necessary. To bold 
that under these covenants a person could improve "'Mrs .. 
W elborne 's lot with a dwelling house and then the next dny 
could use it for business purposes would have the effect of' 
rendering the restrictive covenants illusory and of absolutely 
no effect, yet that is the result of the lower court's decision. 
We do not believe that decision is sound and ask this Court 
to so hold .. 
2. The lower court erred in holding that the def endamt has 
not violated the restr-ictive covenOAits on lier property. 
The language of tlle restrictive covenants in the light of 
the foregoing cases restricts the use of the improvements to a 
dwellin~ and necessarily excludes a business activity. We 
return tor a moment to the ·w11iteburst case. The appellant 
in the Whitehurst case made the point that the restrictions 
did not in express terms provide that the property must be 
used for residential purposes only, and to this contention the. ... 
court answered on p. 576 as· follows: 
".A thing may be forbidden by necessary implication as 
clearly and positively as by terms of express inhibition. In 
the discharge of the task of interpreting a written in-
11 • strument, if it is *apparent upon the whole that the in-
strument carries by definite and necessary implication 
·a certain meaning, then the thing afforded, or denied, hy 
that meaning may be said to be as clearly and definitely ex-
tended, or forbidden, as if the languag·e used had been iu 
p.ositive and definite terms of affirmation or negation." 
.And further the court, after considering the other restric-
tions in the deed, which, like the covenants contained in the 
restrictions· on Mrs. Welborne 's property, were designed t.o 
create a residential district, had this to say on p. 580: 
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''Indeed, we may say, to use the words of a court in an-
other case, 'unless the covenants under consideration· are 
given the construction that the subdivision should be devoted 
to dwelling and not .business purposes, they become a mere 
jumqle of words, and their obvious intent is frustrated'.'' 
And further on p. 580, speaking of the appropriateness of 
the language of the restriction to create a residential dis-
trict, the court said : 
'' Further, the language used not only establishes this gen-
eral purpose, but by inevitable implication it excludes any 
other use of the property." 
The court in the Whitehurst case quoted with approval 
from the case of Powers v. Radding, suvra, which held that 
a covenant restricting a lot to "but one dwelling house'' en-
titled the plaintiffs to an injunction restraining the def erid-
ant from constructing, erecting and maintaining a building 
which should be other than a dwelling house for one family. 
In our case, as in the Whitehurst case, the whole tenor of 
the restrictions in.dica tes a purpose to create a district to 
be used for residential purposes only to the exclusion 
12,N: *of business, and we submit that it is indicated in the 
case at bar as clearly as it was in the Whitehurst case, 
if not clearer. Consider, for example, the restrictionR on 
Mrs. Welborne's property. It is provided that the dwelling 
erected on the lot must be erected in conformity with a build-
ing line twenty feet from the northern line of Monument Ave-
nue, and that a strip of land not less than five feet wide on 
the east and on the west of the dwelling or dwellings should 
be left vacant. It is further provided that the dwellings, or 
each of them, should be as expensive as the adjoining dwell-
ing 011 the east. These are not restrictions which by any 
stretch of the imagination could lend themselves to the de-
velopment of a district in which it was intended that a busi-
ness should be located. Every one of them is appropriate 
aud proper for creating a district which should be used for 
residential purposes only (R., pp. 3, 4). 
The above provisions, or ones practically identical with 
them, were declared by the court in the Whitehurst case to 
exclude any other except residential use of the proprty in-
volved in that case. Mrs. W elborne is not using her property 
for residential purposes, but for business purposes, as she· 
has admitted, and we, therefore, submit that the restrictions 
which gdvern her property should be given the same effect as 
those in the ,Vhitehurst case (R., p. 16). 
' . 
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Let us take a look at what Mrs. Welborne is doing. She 
has, a certificate of occupancy from the Commissioner of 
Buildings of the City of· Richµiond to occupy her house as a 
boarding house, and she has obtained a license from 
13it the City of •Richmond to operate her house as a 4otel. 
She has advertised in the newspapers seeking to attract 
people to the house for rooms and meals and she admits that 
she is engag·ed in conducting a business at her house (R., pp. 
14-15). . . 
In the case of Deitrick v. Leadbetter, 175 Va. 170, the re-
striction was "that said land shall not be used except for resi-
dential purposes'' and, as we have seen above, this is the mean-
ing of the restrictions on the defendant's property in the in-
stant case. In the Deitrick case the defendant made appli-
cation to alter her l1ouse in Ginter Park in such a way as to 
make it suitable for a touris.t home and the plaintiffs brought 
suit to enjoin lier from such use of her property. In uphold-
ing the restrictive covenant the court had this to say at p. 174 
with regard to Mrs. Deitrick 's business, which is very perti-
nent in view of the allegation by Mrs. Welborne that her 
boarders are all well educated people: 
'' This tourist business, as here co11ductecl, is not a 
nuisance. Its patrons are a 'very-high type people. We have. 
had lawyers, doctors, preach~rs, missionaries, and we have 
had a judge from New York'. But if it is a business, then this 
lot is not being used for 'residential purposes' only. That 
it is a business' cannot be seriously questioned. The owner 
tells us that it was bought for business purposes. For its 
conduct a license was necessary and was obtained, and, to fur-
ther her purpose, she became a member of the Richmond 
Chamber of Commerce. It was advertized and a sign was 
posted, indica.tive of its character. Although this restriction 
may be burdensome to this defendant, if it is a lawful hµrden, 
it must be bome, 1m;t as must the restraint of zoning ordi-
nanc~s, to which it bears some analogy." 
And further on p. 175 : 
"Boarding houses are not private residences, and, on prin-
ciple, it makes no difference if the *hoarder stays one day 
14* or two (Tompkins v. Rogers, 2 IC B. 94-Div. Ct.; Thorn 
v. Madden, 1 Ch. 847, 14 RR. C. 286; Trainor v. LeBeck, 
101 N. J. Eq. 823, 139 A. 16; Seeley v. Phi Sigma Delta House 
Corporation, 245 Mich. 252, 222 N. vV .. 180; DingemO/li v. 
Boerth's Estate, 239 Mich. 234, 214 N. W. 239; Sayles v. Hall, 
210 Mass. 281, 96 N. E. 712, 41 L. RA. (N. S.) 625, Ann. Oas. 
1912D, 475), * * • " 
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In the Deitrick ·case this Court upheld· the restrictions .and 
e~joined the defendant. . . 
The judge of the lower cour.t apparently gave no weight 
whatsoever to the f.act tlmt .M:rs. Welborne is conducting a 
business in this residential block. We believe the case at 
bar falls squarely within the law as stated in the Deitrick case., 
and subrriit that the court erred in failing to enforce the re~ 
strictions when they were being violated by a business activity 
such as the defendant's. The rule laid down in the Deitrick 
ease prevails generally. · 
In 26 C. J. S., Sec. 164, p. 527, it is stated: 
'' The maintenance of a rooming house is precluded by a 
limitation of the use of premises to residential purposes only. 
So the use of premises for a boarding or boarding and room-
fog house is in violation of a restriction limiting the use of 
premises to * ;',I: * dwelling houses.'' 
In the case of Dvngemoo v. Boerth's Estate, 214 N. W. 
(Mich.) 239, the premises were restricted to use "for resi-
dential purposes only.~' In upholding the restriction, the 
court said= 
"'Eating is one of the incidents of ''residing" on a lot 
as well as ''rooming'' or sleeping ori the premises. If one 
may conduct a business of renting rooms for hire and be with-
in the restrictions, then ·one should also be entitled to 
. 15* *conduct the business of renting rooms and serving meals 
( a hotel or boarding house), or the business of serving 
meals alone (a restaurant). But either use in my opinion 
would be conducting a business, and consequently, a violation 
of the restriction. So, too, running a rooming house or lodging 
house is clearly a business venture and contrary to the intent 
and purpose of the restrictive covenant.'' . 
In the case of Nerrerter v. Little, 243 N. W. (Mich.) 25, the 
restriction was as follows : 
'' Providing that nothing but a dwelling house or a duplex 
dwelling house might be built on the lots." 
The defendant ran a boarding house for children whose 
parents were separated, and obtained a license from the State 
of Michigan for this purpose. In sustaining the plaintiff's 
prayer for an injunction, the c.ourt approved the above lan-
guage in the Dingeman case and said: 
'' (3, 4) A restriction !,imiting the constructi~n ?fa bui_lding 
on premises to ~ dwellmg house means .a bmldmg: designed 
as a single dwelling to be used by one family. Harri·s v. Rora,. 
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back, 137 Mich. 292, 100 N. W. 391, 109 .Am. St. Rep. 681; 
Bagnall v. Young, 151 Mich. 69,114 N. ·w. 674; Schadt v. BriJ,lr 
173 Mich. 647, 139 N. W. 878, 45 L. R. A.. (N. S.) 726. The-
property itself is in a high-class neighborhood, wholly ·resi-
dential in character. The restriction goes to the use of the-
premises as well as the charaoter of the building. In Dinge-
man v. Boerth's Estate, 239 Mich. 234, 214 N. Vv .. 239, we 
said~ 
'' 'Could a lot owner erect· a large single residence on his 
lot and then: turn it into a hotel or boarding house and still 
claim to be using it for residential purposes! It seems to me 
obvious that such a use would violate the clear intent and 
purpose of the whole plan of development.' '' 
The Michigan court then proceeded to quote with approval 
the excerpt from the Dingeman case which we have given 
above. 
•we have shown by the cases above that a restrictive-
16• covenant would be meaningless and of no val uc wha tso-
ever to a landowner if a restriction as to the kind of 
building did not also govern the use to· which that building 
might be put. "\Ve have also fihown that by the decided cases 
in Virginia that .where it was iutended to create a residential 
district that intention is sufficient I to exclude a business 
activity. Whitehu,rsf v. Hur_qess, supra; Deifrick v. Leadbet-
ter, supra. 
We have further shown that the defendant in the instant 
case is running a boarding house or hotel, which is a business, 
and she has gone to the extent of admitting that she is run-
ning a business. The defendant in this case should be as 
effectively enjoined from the activity which she is pursuing 
as were the defendants in the W11itehurst and Deitrick cases. 
3. The lower coitrt erred in ref1u;ing to enforce the ,·estric-
tive covenants against the defendant. 
The lower court in its opinion rests its dec'ision not to en-
force the covenants on three main points. The first is that 
Mrs. W el borne, the defendant, has not violated the terms of 
the covenant, and the second is that the complainants have not 
shown that they are suffering damage through the acts of the 
defendant, and the third is that upon balaucin~ the con-
veniences it would be inequitable to enjoin the defendapt. 
We believe that we have taken care of the first ground in 
arguing the first two assignments of error. As for the second 
we wish to point out that it is not necessary for the complain-
. . 
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ants *to show any damage .from a violation of the re-
17~ strictive covenants in order to entitle them to have them 
enforced specifically. Spilling v. Hutcheson, 111 Va.179. 
The obvious reason for this rule of law is that where people 
have built or located their homes in a neighborhood in re-
liance on certain restrictions they will necessarily be injured 
by any violation which renders the neighborhood less desirable 
as a place to live. One of the principal purposes of the re-
strictions i~ the .case at bar, as indicated by the limitation 
of the improvements to a dwelling (R., p. 4), was to exclude 
business, and consequently {he introduction of a business into 
the neighborhood will lessen its desirability for residential 
purposes and injure those who must live near it. We use the 
word "injure" rather than "damage" advisedly for we are 
dealing with a wrong whieh is not compensable in money. For 
real relief and in order to obtain what they are justly en-
titled to, the plaintjffs must look to this Court to specifically 
enforce the provision~ of the contract by which the defendant 
is bound. 
In addition to this, a person relying on the defense that 
the complainants will not suffer any substantial injury 
through a violation of a restriction must clearly establish such 
fact. 2o C. J. S., Deeds, p. 574. . 
In the case at bar the defendant has neither alleged nor. 
proved anything with regard to the damage which will be in-
flicted on the complainants if the covenants are not enforced, 
and if she intended to rely on this defense the burden wa~ 
upon her to do so, for, as we have seen, the burden is not upon 
the ""complainants to prove the qitantitrn of the damage 
18'"' which they will suffer. 
. As for the third ground on which the lower court re-
fused to enforce the covenants, we have not found anything 
in the record which could form a basis for the many state-
ments in the opinion of the lower court to the effect that 
the damage to the def enclant would outweigh the benefit to 
the complainants in the event an injunction were .issued, and 
we submit that this conclusion is purely within the realm of 
speculation. There is neither pleading nor proof that the de-
fendant will suffer more than the complainants if an injunc-
tion is issued. On the contrary, we find a situation in which 
we have on one side a person who seeks to introduce a business 
into a residential block, and on the other side the residents 
of the block who have built or purchased their homes there 
in reliance on the covenants. By what process of reasoning 
did the lower court, in the total absence of allegation or proof~ 
ariive at the conclusion that the defendant, who is invading 
the residential district of the complainants, would suffer more 
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than the complainants themselves if the covenants are en-
forced Y After all a covenant by its very nature presupposes 
good faith on the part of the covenantor and the enforcement 
of its terms by t_he proper tribunal. If the obligation of all 
covenants could be avoided as easily as the defendant in this 
case 'bas avoided hers they might well all be abolished for 
a more pliable form. We find nothing in this record to sup-· 
port the lower court's finding that the defendant will suffer 
unduly if the covenants are enforced, and we subµiit that the 
complainants should not be *denied relief on this ground 
19* unless there are both plead~ng and convincing proof to 
· justify such a conclusion. 
While we recognize the wide- discretion given to a chan-
cellor in the matter of injunctions, we must take issue with any 
rule that would allow a chancellor to measure the contract 
rights of the plaintiffs arbitrarily, by anything other than the 
evidence before him. Everi a chancellor's judicial conscience 
should be exercised only in accordance with the well recognized 
principles of pleading and proof. Otherwise, who could tell 
what- might persuade his conscience to grant or withhold re-
lief? Who could ever prevail against a woman armed with 
tears-that weapon so aptly described as the greatest water 
power on earth? Certainly this Court on appeal cannot put 
its finger on the reason for a decision unless it appears in 
the record, and we invite a thorough search of this record. 
·we are confident that there will not be found in it, even by 
implication, that device of logic which the lower court was so 
reluctant to use, any valid ground for holding that the de-
fendant w:ill suffer unduly if the plaintiffs are given the pro-
tection to w11ieh they arc entitled. 
CONCLUSION. 
We conclude with this thought: The defendant's lot was 
improved by a dwelling as required by the covenant -and was 
used as such until the defendant converted it into a boarding 
house or hotel. The defendant contends in effect that all of 
the force and effect of the covenant was exhausted once the 
house was erected in the form of a dwelling, regardless 
20* of the *use subsequently made of it. We have· cited 
munerous authorities to show that this is not the law 
and that the language of the covenant controls the use as 
well as the type of construction. The covenant in clear and 
unambiguous language states that the improvements sl1all be 
a dwelling, thereby excluding a business from the district as 
shown by the Whitehurst case. The defendant is conducting 
a business in the residential district and under the plain Ian-
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guage of the "\Vhitehurst .and Deitrick cases, supra, should 
he enjoined. 
"'\'Vherefore, the pla-intiffs pray that the decree of Septem-
ber 26, 1946, herein may be reviewed and reversed and that 
ihe defendant may he perpetually enjoin.ed an.d restrained 
1rom opera ting or maintaining a boarding house, lodging 
house, or public restaurant at the premise-s No. 2708 Monu- · 
ment A venue, and be required to use said premises only as a 
dwelling for residential purposes. 
Petitioners desire to be heard orally upon the presentation 
-0f this petition which they adopt as their opening brief . 
.A. copy of this petition was duly delivered to Charles E. 
Maurice, counsel for. the defendant, on November 22, 1946, 
with notice that on that day the original is to be filed in the 
office of the Clerk of this Court at Richmond. 
ROSALIE H. SCHW ARZSCHIL]?, 
THOMAS B. GAY, 
ANNA ·B. BOYKIN, and 
LEE PASCHALL, 
By GORDON & GORDON, 
Their Attorneys. 
21 * The undersigned attorneys at law, practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, certify that in 
their opinion there is error in the decree complained of in the 
foregoing petition and that the same should be reviewed and 
1·eversed. · 
JAMES W. GORDON, 
JAMES W. GORDON, JR. 
r~ceipt of a copy of the foregoing petition for appeal and 
notice tl1at the original thereof will be filed with the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia at Richmond on 
November ·22, 1946, is hereby .acknowledged this 22nd. day of 
November, 1946. 
MYRTLE A. WELBORNE, 
By: CHAS. E. MAURICE, 
Her Attorney at Law. 
Received November ~2, 1946. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
January 7, 1947. Appeal awarded by the court. No addi-
·tional bond required. 
M.B.W. 
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RECORD : 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Willis D. Miller, Judge of the 
Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, held for 
the said City at·the Courtroom thereof in the City Hall on 
the 26th day·_of September, 1946. 
Be it rem~mbered that heretofore, to-wit: At the Rules 
held in the Clerk's Office of the said Law and Equity· Court 
of the City of Richmond, on the Third Monday in April, 1945 : 
eame Elsie Boyd Tucker, Sudie R. '\V ood, Anne J. Scott,, 
Rosalie H. Schwarzschild, Thomas B. Gay., Anna B. Boykin 
and Lee Paschall, by Cou11sel and filed their bill against 
Myrtle A. W elborne, which Bill is in the words and figures 
following, to-wit: 
'' Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond~ 
To Honorable Willis D. :Miller, Judge: 
Humbly complainant, your complainant, _Elise Boyd 
Tucker, Sudie R. ·wood, Anne J. Scott, Rosalie H. Schwarzs-
child; Thomas B. Gay, Anna B. Boykin and Lee Paschall, 
show unto your Honor the following case : 
1. Subject to the restrictions mentioned in paragraph two 
below, complainants are the owners in fee simple and resi-
dents., respectively, of the premises with the impr·ovemeilts 
thereon located in the City of Richmond, Virginia, and known 
as Nos. 2700, 2702, 2704, 2710, 2712, 2714 and 2716 Monument 
Avenue. Complainant Lee Paschall is also the 
page 2 ~ owner of the lot of land at the northeast corner of 
Monument Avenue and the Boulevard. Subject to 
the restrictions set forth in paragraph five below, the defend-
ant herein, Myrtle A. ,v elborne, is the owner in fee simple 
of the lot with the improvements thereon lrnow1i as No. 2708 
Monument Avenue, having acquired title to said land by deed 
dated December 4, 1944, from Frances H. Swink, a widow. 
Complainants and the defendant derive their title to said real 
estate from John P. Branch as the.ir comm·on grantor. 
2. About the year 1909., when he was the owner of all of 
the said real estate now owned by complainants and the de-
fendant, the said John P. Branch conceived and established a 
general plan creating a highly restricted block for the erec-
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tion of residences on Monument A venue, and, pursuant and 
subject to said plan, the said John P. Branch and his suc-
cessor in title, Kingsland Land Corporation, of which the 
said John P. Branch owned 8,160 out of 8,164 shares issued, 
conveyed the said premises now owned by complainants and 
the defendant to them, or to their predecessors in title, by 
deed containing restrictions. included therein for the purpose 
of creating and maintaining a highly restricted residential 
block. 
3. Said restrictions were placed on said lots for the pur-
pose of enabling purchasers thereof to rely on the same in 
improving their lots, and said restrictions were intendt~d to 
enure to the benefit of all of the lot owners. 
4. Complainants, or their predecessors in title., purchased 
· their lots in reliance on the restrictions placed 
page 3 ~ thereon, and, in further reliance thereon, erected 
. upon said lots handsome residences which, together 
with the lot and improvements of defendant, are now assessed 
for taxation at an ag·gregate value of $149,-600.00~ and all of 
said houses, including that of the defendant, had been con-
tinuously used since their erection solely as dwellings or pri-
vate residences until tl1e acts of the defendant hereinafter 
stated. 
5. The defendnnt, Myrtle A. ,velborne, acquired her title to 
the said premises at No. 2708 :Monument Avenue by m.esne 
conveyances from A. L. Straus, wl10, in turn, purchased said 
lot from the said J olm P. Branch by deed dated February 5, 
1912, duly recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Chancery 
Court of the City of Richmond in Deed Book 214-A, page 463. 
The said A. L. Straus was a signatory to said deed from John 
P. Branch to him, and by his signing and accepting said deed 
he bound himself, his heirs, devisees, executors, administra-
tors, personal representatives and assigns forever to observe 
the following covenants a,nd restrictions contained in said 
deed: 
'' It is covenanted and ag-reed by thC' party of the second 
part that no part of tlie Raid land shall be sold, leased or 
otherwise disposed of at any time l1ereafter to any person 
who is a.negro or of African descent. . . 
"It is further covenanted and agreed that when the said 
land is improved by the said party of the i;:;econcl part or his 
executors, administrators, heirs, devisees or assigns, there 
shall not be erected more than two (2) dwellings thereon, and 
that the said dwelling or dwellipgs shall be erected in con-
formity with the bnilding line as already established by the 
house ·now at the corner of Mulberrv Street and Monument 
Avenue, which building line is Twenty Feet (20') distant from 
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the North line of Monument Avenue, meaning thereby that 
the furthest projection ( not including· open porch or necessary 
steps of any building·) shall not be nearer than Twenty Feet 
(20') to the North line of Monument Avenue, and 
page 4 ~ that a strip of land not less than Five Feet (5') wide 
on the East side of the most eastern of said dwell-
ings, and a strip of land, not less than Five ·Feet ( 5') wide 
on the West side of the most western of said dwellings, and 
a strip of land not less than Ten Feet (10') wide between the 
two said dwellings one to be left vacant, with the privilege 
to the party of the second part or assigns of building One (1) 
dwelling· on said lot and of ·leaving greater strips of land un-
improved on the East and West sides of said dwelling. 
''The party of the second part covenants and ·agrees that 
if the said land is improved, such improvements shall be a 
dw~lling or two dwellings and that each dwelling sl1all be e~-
pensive as the adjoining dwcilling ( on the East) on this. block, 
which covenants and restrictions are accepted as part of the 
considerations of .this deed and are to run with the land. 
"The party of the first part. covenants and agrees that in 
selling the land on the Vv est be will place thereon a restric-
tion as to the same building- lines and the vacancy of the Five 
Feet· (5') immediately adjoining on the West the ~bove de-
scribed land, but not restricting as to the. size of the lots on-
the West of the said land conveyed by this .deed. 
* * • (English covenants) 
'' The party of the ~econd part acc()pts the conditions of 
this deed and by joining in these presents hereby binds him-
self., his heirs, devisees, executors, administrators, personal 
representatives and assigns forever." 
Said lot fronts Ninety-four Feet (94') on the North side 
of Monument Avenue, and the improvements consist of one 
large handsome dwe}ling with a spacious lawn adjoining to 
the East. - · 
6. The said defendant acquir~d her title to said property 
with notice of the restrirtions which had been imposed upon 
it, as aforesaid, but, notwithstanding- said notice, within a 
short time after purchasing the same, began to and has since 
continuallv violated said covenants in that she has since J anu-
ary 5, 1945, operated a boarding house, a lodging house, and 
public restaurant at No. 2708 Monument Avenue, 
. page 5 ~- to which she seeks to attract boarders, lodg·ers and 
customers by continually advertising in the news-
papers of the City of Richmond. · 
7. Your cqmplainants aver and charge as follows: 
(a) That the said 2700 block Monument Avenue was im-
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proved by the lot owners with handsome dwellings in reliance 
on the restrictions placed in the dee.ds to them and .all of said 
-dwellings, with the exception of that of defendant., have been 
.continuously since their ,erection and now are used exclu-
sively as dwelling·s f-0r private residences.; 
(b) That the -defendant, Myrtle .A. Welborne~ purchased 
the premises No. 2708 .l\fonumen"t Avenue with notice that she 
was restricted to u.sin_g .said premises for a dwelling house 
only; 
( c) That the operation an.d maint.enanc.e of a boarding 
house, a lodging house, or public restaurant on said premises 
constitutes a violation of said covenant restricting said land 
to a dwelling· hous·e ; 
( d) · That complainants, as the owners of the other lots in 
said 2700 block Monument A venue, are entitled to enforce 
against the said Myrtle A. ,Velborne the restrictions con-
tained in the deed from John P. Branch to her predec'essor in , 
title, A. L. Straus, and are entitled to a mandatory injµnction 
.against the said Myrtle A. W.elborne enjoining and restrain-
ing her from operating and maintaining said premises at No. 
2708 Monument Avenue .as a boarding houseJ a ]odging house 
or public restaurant. 
In consideration whereof, and forasmuch as complainants 
are without remedy save in a court of equity where such mat-
ters alone are cognizable, complainants pray tlmt Myrtle .A. 
'Vtr elborne may be made party defendant to this suit, 
page 6 } and required to answer the same., but ans~er under 
oath is waived; that process may issue; that the 
defendant, Myrtle A. W elborne, be perpetually enjoined and 
restrained from operating or maintaining a boarding house, 
a lodging house, or public restaurant at the premises No. 2708 
Monument A venue, and 1·equired to use said premises only as 
a dwelling for residential purposes; and that your complain-
ants may have such furtber and general relief as the nature 
of their case may require or to equity may seem meet. And 
they will ever pray, etc. 
ELSIE BOYD TUCKER, 
SUDIE R. WOOD, 
.ANNE J. SCOTT, 
ROSALIE H. SCHW .ARZSCHILD, 
THOMAS B. GAY, 
ANNA B. BOYKIN and 
LEE PASCHALL, 
ROSALIE H. SCHW ARZSCHILD 
By: GORDON A:Nn GORDON, 
Counsel 
GORDON-& GORDON.; p. q .. 
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State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
Before me, W. H. Metzger, a Notary Public for the City 
aforesaid in the State of Virginia, personally appeared Rosa-
lie H. Schwarzschild, who, being first duly sworn, made oath 
before me in my City aforesaid., that the statements contained 
in the foregoing· bill of complaint are true to the best of her 
knowledge, information and belief. · 
My commission expires on the 28 · day of Jan., 1946. 
Given und~i· my hand thi.', 18th day of April, 1945. 
(Notarial Seal) 
W. H. METZGER 
Notary Public 
page 7 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity 
ourt of the City of Richmond, held the 11th day of 
July, 1945. 
This day came the defendant by counsel and asked leave to 
file her answer herein which leave is according·ly granted ancl 
said answer is accordingly filed. 
Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Elsie Boyd Tucker, et als., Complainants 
v. 
Myrtle A. Welborne, Respondent 
ANSWER.-
The defendant, Myrtle A. Welborne, for answer to said bill 
or to so much thereof as she is advised that it is material and 
proper that she should answer, answers and says: 
(1) Your respondent admits that she is the owner of 
#2708 Monument A venue, Rfohmond, Virginia, having ac-
quired the same by deed. recorded December 5, 1944, in the 
Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia.~ for a con-
sideration of $32,500.00, said property being subject to a 
first Deed of Trust for $17,500.00 and interest securing that 
portion of the purchase price. Your respondent neither af-
firms nor denies the allegations of ownership of the other 
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lands mentioned in paragraph one, as this is not :within her 
knowledge. · 
(2) Your respondent for answer to paragraph 
page 8 ~ two says that she had no knowledge or notice of any 
plan or idea that was conceived and established by 
John P. Branch, his successor in title or anyone else, nor, if 
such in fact existed, is she bound by them other than by the 
specific t~rms of the restrictions applicable to her property, 
and she denies that said restrictions deny to her the right to 
use the said premises as they are now being· used. 
(3) Your respondent neither. affirms nor denies the alle-
gations of parag-raph three as this is not within l1er knowl-
edge! 
( 4) This respondent neitlrnr affirms nor denies the allega-
tions of paragTaph Four, and calls for strict proof of the 
same. 
( 5) This respondent adinits the allegations of· paragraph 
five. 
(6) Your respondent admits the ownership, subjee!t, to the 
deed of trust herein before mentioned, of the premises No. 
2708 Monument A venue ancl that since January 5, 19~5, she 
has had others than hetself living at these premises, but in 
no sense of the word has she conducted a boarding house, a 
lodging house or public restaurant, in the common acceptance 
of these terms, althougl1 there is nothing is said restrictions 
heretofore referred to to prevent her from doing so if she so 
desired, and she calls for ~trict proof of the violation of any 
covenants as charged. 
(7) Your respondent denies the allegations of paragraph 
seven and its sub-sections and calls for strict proof of the 
same. 
Your respondent states that .the dwelling house #2708 was 
built long prior to her purchase of said premises and that she 
. has neither added to nor changed the house in any 
page 9 ~ respect, except to paint and redecorate the interior 
thereof. That the said dwelling· is a large three 
story brick building and contains twelve bedrooms and this 
in itself, together. with the acute shortage of housing accom-
modations incident to the war and generally changed condi-
tions was probably one of the determining factors in causing 
the Council of the City of Richmond, Va., to rezone this par-
ticular neighborhood to an '' E Multiple Family District'' by 
Ordinance adopted tluly, 1943. That prior to this change the 
City Planning Commission and the Ordinance Committee ad-
vertised extensively thru the public press and otherwise 
that this change was proposed. to be made and the acting . 
secretary of said bodies, Mr. J a~es Bolton, has advised your 
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respondent that at none of the many public hearings on this 
subject do his records of said meetings show that any objec-
tion was made by the complainants to the proposed change 
and that tbey were the then owners of properties set forth in 
their Bill of Complaint. 
Your respondent has complied with all local laws and regu-
lations for the conduct of a ''boarding house" and does have 
others than herself maintaining their dwelling pla~e at the 
above address, and while she has a perfect right to do so., she 
does not maintain a "boarding house", in the commitz.g ac-
ceptance of the term. Your respondent has a very select 
number of persons who maintain their residence and dwell-
ing place with her and they are all of the very highest . type 
as is indicated by the following names: 
Mr. & Mrs. Harrv Sutton and Son 
Mr. Sutton is a ·Factory representative of the Firestone 
Fire and Rubber Company. 
page 10 ~ Mr. & Mr~. Thomas ·wright 
Mr. ·wright is related to the DuPonts, is finan-
cially independent and is the owner ·of of the "Edgehill Es-
tate." 
Mr. & Mrs. Rolph Provost 
Mr. Provost is a business representative of the Eastern 
Air Lines. His wife is eng·aged_ in Red Cross Work. 
Miss Elizabethe Steel Houchens and Miss Marjorie Riggs 
These two ladies l1old responsible positions in the educational 
·. field. 
• It might be added that all of.these persons are college grad-
uates and hold colleg·e degrees, so your respondent is in-
formed. Your respondent does not accept overnight guests, 
nor furnish meals, and those residing at her home have come 
with the idea of making- their stay permanent so long as their 
business permitted. None have been with your respondent 
for less than three months.'' 
The lawns and rose gardens of said dwelling are main-
tained as always in the best of care and there has never been 
the least confusion or disorder of any kind at any time. your 
respondent calls for strict proof of any fact or circumstance 
that would even tend to indicate that #2708 Monument Ave-
nue is being used for anything other than a residence or 
dwelling or violative of any restrictivecovenant affecting said 
premises. 
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Now, therefore, your defendant having fully answered the 
said bill of Complaint, prays that she be hence dismi<,sed, with 
her proper costs in this behalf .expended. 
CHAS. E. MAURICE, P. D. 
MYRTLE A. WELBOR.NE 
, Defendant 
by Counsel 
page 11 } And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond,· held the 
28th day of December, 1945. 
This cause having been docketed and -set for hearing by 
consent of counsel for all parties at 10 :00 o'clock A. M. on 
December 28, 19-45, at said time caine the complainants and 
defendant, by counsel, to argue said cause; and the Court 
inquired of counsel if the cause was to be heard on the bill of 
complaint, the answer, the general replication and the stipula-
tion of facts dated November 29, 1945, which is hereby filed 
and made a part of tlie record in this cause. And counsel for 
complainants and for defendant answered in the affirmative 
that this cause was to be so heard, and the Court heard the 
argument in chief on behalf of the complainants. 
At the conclusion of said argument, counsel for complain-
ants stated that Elsie Boyd Tue.ker and Sudie R. Wood., two 
of the complainants, wished to withdraw as plaintiffs in this 
cause. Thereupon counsel for the defendant presented to the 
Court a letter dated November 19, 1945, addressed to Lee 
Paschall and signed Wm. P. Wood, a copy of which is hereto 
attached and made a part of the record.· Tl1e Court then -
asked counsel for the defendant if said letter was offered 
merely as evidence of the wish of the said Sudie R. Wood to 
withdraw, or for such purpose and for the purpose of being 
considered as evidence. Counsel for the defendant replied 
. that lie was offering said letter to evidence the desire of the 
said Sudie R. Wood to withdraw and as a declaration against 
interest, to he considered as evidence by the 
page 12 }. Court, and that if said letter were rejected the de-
fendant desired an opportunity to take further evi-
dence. Counsel for the complainants objected to the use ot 
said letter as evidence of. the statements therein contained 
and to the taking of any further evidence by the defendant 
on the ground that said letter is not a declaration against 
interest but is res inter alios acta, and on the further ground 
that counsel for the defendant received said letter on No-
vember 19, 1945, and signed the stipulation of facts herein-
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above filed on November 28, 1945, and was duly notified by 
· counsel for the complainants by a letter dated December 11,. 
1945, which is hereby made a part of the record, that the 
Court had fixed the time of the hearing for December 28, 1945, . 
and that at that time ;would not hear any ore tenus evidence 
in the cause, but that if eit~er side wished to take any evi-
dence by depositions they should be taken and filed by said 
date, and no such deposition had been taken by the defend-
ant. 
Upon consideration whereof, the Court doth reject said 
letter date.d November 19, 1945, and refuse to admit the same 
as evidence in this cause, but doth grant the right to the de-
fendant to take such depositions as she may be advised to be 
considered by the Court with said stipulation, provided said 
depositions be taken on or before January 18, 1946, and doth 
· grant to complainants a furthe1· period of twenty days from 
January 18, 1946, to take depositions in reply,, to which action 
of the Court in allowing the defendant to take further evi-
dence, the complainants, by counsel, objected on the grounds 
stated above. 
And leave is g'l'anted the said Elsie Boyd Tucker and Sudie 
R. Wood to withdraw from this cause as parties 
page 13 ~ plaintiff, which is accordingly done, and it is or-
dered that this cause do henceforth proceed in the 
name of Anne J. Scott as the named complainant. 
Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Elsie Boyd Tucker, et als., Complainants, 
'IJ. 
:Myrtle A. "\Velborne, Defendant. 
STIPULATION. 
vVithout prejudice to the right of appeal of either party,. 
it is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between all parties 
hereto as follows: 
1. That the sole. question to be determined in this cause 
is whether the defendant's use and occupancy of the premises 
No. 2708 Monument Avenue, Richmond, Virginia, constitute 
a violation of the terms of the restrictive covenants set forth 
in paragraph :five of tl1e bill of complaint, by which it is agreed 
the defendant i& bound unless (a) the complainants· are 
estopped by their conduct from enforcing the same or (b) 
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there has been such a general change in the neighborhood as 
to render it inequitable to enforce the same; 
That if said use and occupancy do constitute such a viola-
tion, complainants are entitled to an injunction against the 
defendant on the grounds alleged and as prayed in their bill; 
That if said use and occupancy do not constitute 
page 14 ~ such a violation, the complainants' bill should be 
dismissed; 
That the Zoning Ordinance date May 19, 1943, and the Li-
cense Code of the City of Richmond in force on February 4, 
1945, may be considered by the Court as if duly filed in evi-
dence. 
2. That the following facts are to be considered as proven 
by.depqsitions duly taken, from which the Court may d°raw 
such reasonable inferences as may be proper; 
The defendant owns the house .located at No. 2708 Monu-
me:nt A venue, Richmond, Virginia, containing twelve bed-
rooms and seven bathrooms, for which she obtained on Janu-
ary 5., 1945, from the Commissioner of Buildings of the City 
of Richmond a certificate of occupancy permitting said prem-
ises to be occupied as a hoarding house as defined by the Zon-
ing Ordinance of the City of Richmond. Of the aforesaid 
baths, one shower was installed on the third floor by the de-
fendant after her purchase of said property; 
That the Fire Department made an inspection of her prem-
ises prior to January 4, 1945, and ordered her '' to brick up 
two arches leading to boiler room and coal bin; to cover two 
wooden doors and trim with metal, which also open into 
boiler room; arches to be built up of 4 in. brick", as a pre-· 
requisite to occupying- said house as a boarding house. 
Pursuant to said orders of the Fire Department, she did 
thereafter on January 4, 1945, apply to the Bureau of Build-
ing Inspection of the Department of Public Safety for a per-
mit, and a permit was issued January 5, 1945, to make the 
· following specified alterations at No. 2708 :M:onu-
page 15 ~ ment A venue, which were thereafter made by t:lae 
defendant in order to occupv said property as a 
boarding house : · 
'' To brick up two arches leading to boiler room and coal 
bin; to cover two wooden doors and trim with metal, which 
also open into boiler room; arches to be built of 4" brick. T-0 
build in two closets in two third floor bedrooms, to be of sheet 
rock.'' 
On February 4., 1945, the defendant obtained from the Com-
missioner of Revenue of the City of Richmond, Virginia, a 
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license to operate said premises during the year 1945 as '' a 
hotel'' of twelve rooms and seven bathrooms. 
Thai from January 5, 1945, to May 3, 1945, the defendant 
has from time to time inserted in the newspapers of the City 
of Richmond the following· advertisement: 
"MONUMENT AVE.-An ideal home for those away from 
the comforts of their own. Room with or without bath. Meals 
that satisfy. 4-3300." · 
which appeared in the classified advertisements of the Rich-
mond News-Leader and the Richmond Times-Dispatch under 
the -heading 
'' Rooms with Meals 99.'' 
The defendant only being able to obtain a telephone under 
war conditions as ''a hot~l", applied for and obtained a tele-
phone under such classification, and her said home is classi-
fied in the current classified telephone directory as a hotel, 
and is listed in the aphabetical section in said directory as 
"W elborne Hotel, 2708 Monument Avenue.'' 
It is admitted by the complainants that No. 2708 Monument 
. Avenue is a large three-story brick building wi~h 
page 16 ~ twelve bedrooms and six bathrooms originally, and 
that they, nor anyone acting in their behalf, of-
fered any objection or opposition to the proper city au-
thorities to the re-zoning and classification of this property 
to "E Multiple Family District". 
The complainants admit that tl1ere have been no cl1anges in 
the outward appearance of the building; that the rose gardens, 
lawn and general ouh\•arc} appearance~ are well kept; that 
tne occupants of No. 2708 Monument A venue are quiet., or-
derly and well behaved, and that there is no disorder on the 
premises as far as they can observe. 
It is admitted by the defendant that since ,T anuary 5, 1945, 
sbe has conducted the busineRs of renting rooms in lwr hous6 
to others, as is fully set forth in paragraph seven of her an-
~wer. The defendant bas in the past and since January 5, 
1945, served meals to persons renting rooms in her l10use. 
She is not serving· meals at presel)t to such persons, but 
claims the right to do so in the future. 
3. That tl1e Court may consider any further evidence, duly 
taken by depositions, 01·e tenu.s or otherwise for the purpose 
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of determining the .sole issue in this cause as set forth in para-
graph one above. 
MYRTLE A. WELBORNE 
hy CHAS. E. MAURICE, her Atty. at Law 
ANNE J. SCOTT, 
ROSALIE J. SCH\V ARZSCHILD, 
-THOMAS B. GAY, 
.A.NNA B. BOYKIN and 
LEE PASCHALL 
by JAMES W. GORDON~ JR. 
Their attorney at law. 
November 29th,, 1945. 
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Virginia: 
. (Filed Sep~ember 26, 1946.) 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
. Anne J. Scott, et als., Complainants, 
v. 
Myrtle .A. \Velborne, Defendant. 
STIPULATION. 
Without prejudice to the right of appeal of- either party, 
it is hereby further stipulated and agreed by and between 
the parties hereto as follows, the plaintiffs not hereby waiv-
ing any objections contained in the decree herein of Decem-
ber 28, 1945: 
1. That since the death of Dr. Beverly R. Tucker on July 
19, 1945, Elsie Boyd Tucker, his widow, who resides at No. 
2700 Monument Avenue, Richmond, Virginia, and who was, 
one of the complainants in this suit until her withdrawal by . 
order herein of December 28, 1945, has been and is now, due ~"" 
to :financial difficulties, renting four rooms in her house to 
others. 
2. That no other person in the 2~00 block Monument Ave-
nue, other than Mrs. Myrtle A. Welborne and Mrs. Elsie 
Boyd Tucker,. are taking in roomers or boarders. 
3. The deed of agreement dated October 1, .1921, between 
Beverly R. Tucker, et als., recorded November 10, 1921, in 
Deed Book 275-D, page 203, Richmond Chancery Court, a copy 
of which is hereto attached, shall be considered evidence in 
this case and a part of this stipulation; and it is further agreed 
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that said dwelling at 2708 Monument Avenue bud 
pag·e 18 ~ never, until its purchase by the defendant, been 
used for any purpose other than as a private resi-
dence. 
4. A letter from the Board of Real Estate Assessors, City 
of Richmond, Virginia, dated January 7, 1946, addressed to 
Charles E. Maurice, showing the location of certain apart-
ment buildings on Monument Avenue and West Grace Street,. 
-a copy of which is hereto attached, shall be considered evi-
dence in this case and a part of this stipulation, subject to 
the objectjon of the complainants that said letter is irrele-
vant and immaterial. 
5. A letter from the Department of Finance, Office of Li-
cense Inspection, City of Richmond, Virginia, elated January 
2, 1946, addressed to Charles E. Maurice, showing lice.nses 
issued for businesses and businesse now being conducted on 
Monument Avenue and vVest Grace Street, a copy of which 
is hereto attached, shall be considered evidence in this case 
and a part of this stipulation, subject. to the objection of 
the complainants that said letter is irrelevant and imma-
terial. 
It is further agreed, without waiving said objection, that 
the businesses of commission. merchant and retail merchant 
listed in said letter, except the business being conducted at 
No. 2036 Monument Avenue, do not involve visits to said ad-
dresses by prospective customers of said licensees as i~ 
usually implied by said terms. As to No. 2036 Monument Ave-
nue, the retail merchants license at said address is for the 
conduct of the Jefferson-Lakeside Social Club, an affiliate of 
Lakeside Golf Club. 
6. A copy of the District Map of the City of Rich-
page 19 ~ mond, Virginia, which is a part of the Zoning 
Ordinance approved May 19, 1943, as amended to 
.February 5, 1945, shall be considered evidence and a part of 
this stipulation. 
MYRTLE A. WELBORNE, 
By CHAS. E. MAURICE, 
Her Attorney at Law. 
ANNE J. SCOTT, 
ROSALIE J. SCHWARZSCHILD, 
THOMAS B. GAY, . 
ANNA B. BOYKIN and • 
LEE PASCHALL, 
By JAMES W. GORDON, JR., 
Their Attorney at Law. 
January 17th, 1946. 
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page 20 } BOARD OF REAL ESTATE ASSESSORS 
City of Richmond, Virginia 
January 7, 1946 
Mr. Charles E. Maurice, 
Attorney at law, 
Mutual Building, 
Richmond 19, Virginia. 
Re: Records of the Board of Assessors regarding certain 
buildings on Monument A venue and West Grace 
Street 
Dear Sir: . . 
At your request we are very happy to furnish you informa~ 
tion regardjng the number of apartments as shown by our 
records to be located on the respective blocks as described 
hereafter. 
No. 1 Block bounded by Mulberry, Monument, Boulevard, 
and Grace. 
According to our records there are three apartment build-
ings on this block, namely : 
705-7 North Boulevard 
709-11 North Boulevard 
2735 W. Grace Street 
12 Apartments 54 Rooms 
12 Apartments 54 Rooms 
6 Apartments 24 Rooms 
No. 2. Block bounded by Mulberry, Grace, Boulevard, and 
Broad Street. 
Our records show that in this block located on the north 
line of Grace and east line of the Boulevard, the following 
·apa,rtments are located: 
2710 W. Grace Street 
2714-16 W. Grace Street 
2718-20 W. Grace Street 
2724 W.·Grace Street 
2726-28 W. Grace Street 
2730 W. Grace Street 
2734-36 W. Grace ·street 
801-3 North Boulevard 
805 North Boulevard 
811 North Boulevard 
12 Apartments 48 Rooms 
12 Apartments 48 Rooms 
12 Apartments 48 Rooms 
12 Apartments 42 Rqoms 
12 Apartments 48 Rooms 
12 Apartments · 30 Rooms 
.-12 Apartments 36 Rooms 
12 Apartments 36 Rooms 
12 Apartments 36 Rooms 
12 Apartments 36 Rooms 
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No. 3. Block bounded by Boulevard, Monument, Sheppard 
and Grace. 
Our records show that in this block the following apart-
ment houses are located: 
page 21 ~ 706-8 North Boulevard 6 Apartments 39 Rooms 
2800 Monument Avenue 12 Apartments 42 Rooms 
2806 Monument A venue 12 Apartments 42 Rooms 
2810 Monument Avenue 12 Apartments 36 Rooms 
2812 Monument A venue 12 Apartments 48 Rooms . 
2816 Monument Avenue 12 Apartments 72 Rooms 
2820 Monument A venue 3 Apartments 18 Rooms . 
2822 Monument Avenue 3 Apartments 18 Rooms 
2824 Monument Avenue 3 Apartments 18 Rooms 
2826 Monument Avenue 3 Apartments 27 Rooms 
2828 Monument A venue 3 Apartments 18 Rooms 
2830 Monument Avenue 6 Apartments 15 Rooms 
2832-34 Monument Avenue 12 Apartments 36 Rooms 
801 N. Sheppard Avenue 6 Apartments 18 Rooms 
807 N. Sheppard Avenue · 6 Apartments 42 Rooms 
2807-9 W. Grace Street 6 Apartments 30 Rooms 
We hope that the above information answers your request. 
. . 
Very truly yours, 
BOARD OF REAL ESTATE ASSESSORS, 
By:ROBT. L. SAVILLE 
ROBT. L. SAVILLE. 
RLS :A VB Chairman. 
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RICHMOND, VIRGINIA.-
I 
Mr. Charles E. Maurice 
501 Mutual Building 
Richmond, Virginia 
Dear Sir: 
January 2nd, 1946. 
In accordance with your request I am pleased to list be-
low all business licenses issued by this office for the year 
1945 covering businesses being conducted on Monument Ave-
nue and West Grace Streets between the 2000 and 2900 blocks 
west. 
I . 
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. ' 
'2006 Monument A venue 
2021 ·4' ,(I( 
'2030 " " 
'2031 "' ~ 
2034 " "' 
2036 " " 
'2207 '" "' 
'2200 U 'H 
'2216 " " 
'2218 "' '" 
:2327 '' " 
2600 '" .u 
· '2608 " "' 
'2610 « "' 
'2708 " "' 
'2830 u "' 
:8001 u .u 
3121 u "' 
:a203 ,U :.u 
'2003 West Grace St 
'2017 . "' '" :u 
'2025 "' "' " 
'2026 "' '" '" 
2033 " " '' 
'2221 "' "' "' 
'2226 u '' "' 
'2227 " .(.( '" 
2236 "' " ·u 
'2239 "'' " "' 
~315 "' "' .u 
;page 23l 
2335 West Ura-ce S't 
2504 "" "' "' 
2515 "' "' " 
2517 "" '" '" 
2519 u u u 
2521 .u .u "' 
2523 '"' "' " 
2524 "' "" " 
'2609 "" " " 
2611 " H .(C 
'2612 " " " 
2810 " " " 
'2828 " " " 
2917 .u .I,( " 
Emery Gray 
Mrs G. L. Martin. 
F S Thomassoa 
Miss Ethel Reams 
Mrs RS Wood 
·WilTie Jackson & Otto Johnson 
.Mrs C W Seddon 
Mrs Katherine Weaver 
Verta L Ingersoll 
Mrs Myrtle Z-unmerman 
Miss .L M White 
Mrs. Elinor Fry Phillips 
Elinor Fry Sckool of Dance 
Mrs Hattie J St John 
Arnette S Beddow 
Mrs. Myrtle ·welborne 
'D. Brandt Harris 
Mrs W B Matthews 
M: HWells 
R J Carlton · 
Mrs M. S. Vmcent 
Mrs Susie Best 
Mrs Florence E. Rowlett ' 
J.. D. Spencer 
Mrs NM 'ro"7D.es 
MF Garwood 
W L Norden· 
Mrs Evelyn S Thomas 
Sarah Frances Henry 
Mrs L M Ellis 
Mrs Mabel ·B Rfohardsom 
0 M Levenson. 
Mrs C. R Julian 
Mrs Eva. L Smith 
Mrs H W Edwards 
Mrs BL.Dodd 
Mrs Vera W. Higgason 
Mrs I M Williams 
Geo EHughes 
Mrs A L Burton 
Mrs Chas R Moss 
Dr. Rema M King 
Arthur Stone 
E L Pollard-Polly's Clnrs 
Conine Iseman 






































" ,u Board. H. 
Chiropractor 
··R. Mer. 
CI & Press. 
Dancing School 
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501 N. Robinson Si 
'108 N. 
C. L. Wintfiefd 
Midway Barber Shop 






D .. ANDREW WELCH 
License Inspect.or· 
page 24 f This deed, made this :first day of October, A. D. 
19,21, by and between Beverly R. Tucker, and Elsie 
Boyd Tucker, his wife, and William P. Wood, and Sudie 
R.-- Wood, his wife, and Mary E~ Miller, a widow, and 
Wm. H. Schwartzschild, and Rosalie H. Schwartzscnild, his 
wife, and Essie S. Labenberg, a widow, and Martha P. Branch 
and M. S. Branch, her husband, and Lee' Paschall, and Edith 
L. Paschall, his wife, all of the City of Richmond, Va., and 
the Kingsland Land Corporation, parties of the first part,. 
and hereinafter for convenience designated and referred to 
as "grantors", and the Virginia Trust Company and Eliza-
beth D. Miles, as Executors and Trustee of and under the-
last will and testament of Walter~- Miles, deceased, parties 
· of the second part, and hereinafter for convenience desig-
nated and referred to as ''grantees'' 
Whereas, the said gTantors, parties of the first part, and 
the said grantees, parties of the second part are seized in 
fee-simple, and are the sole owners, of that ·entire area or 
land, in the.City of Richmond, Va., fronting on the North line 
of Monument A venue, and exteµding Westwardly from the 
West line of Mulberry Street to the East line of the Boule-
vard, and back from said frontage to the public alley in the 
rear fifteen (15'} wide; being the same area of land formerly 
owned in its entirety by the late John P. Branch, from whom 
all of the said parties hereto trace title; and, _ . 
Whereas, the said grantors, parties of the first part, ac-
quired title to their respective lots or parcels of said land, 
fronting on the North line of Monument Avenue, between saicl 
Mulberry street and the Boulevard, as aforesaid, 
page 25 ~ under and by virtue of the several following men-
tioned deeds of bargain and sale, all of record in 
the office of the Clerk of the Chancery Court of the City of 
Richmond, Va., namely:-
Beverly R. Tucker, from Chas. Hutzler,. widower, by deed 
dated 6th, Mar. 1917, and of record in said Clerk's office in 
D. B. 242-B, p. 422, conveying the sixty (60') feet frontage 
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at the Northwest corner of Mulberry street and Monument 
Avenue; 
William P. Wood, from Edward N. Calisch, & wife, by 
deed dated 1st. Sept. 1913, and of record in said Clerk's Of-
fice in D. B. 224-C, p. 112, conveying the forty ( 40') feet front. 
age next adjoining· on the West :-
Mary E. Miller, from D. C. 0 'Flaherty, & wife, by deed 
dated 1st, July, 1919, and of record in said Clerk's Office in 
D. B. 252-C. p. 480, conveying the thirty-six (36') !eet front. 
age next adjoining on the West; 
Wm. H. Schwartzschild, from John P. Branch, widower: 
by deed dated 5th, Feb. 1912, and of record in said Clerk's 
Office in D. B. 215-D, p. 153, conveying the sL"{ty (60') feet 
frontage next adjoining the lot of the grantees herein on the 
West; 
Essie S. Labenberg, from Pollard & Bagby, Inc., Trustee, 
by deed dated 31st, Mar. 1921, and of record in said Clerk's 
Office in D .. B. 272-D, p. 261, com·eying the forty-five (45') 
feet frontage next adjoining on the West:-
W eston T. Selden, from Kingsland Land Corporation, by 
deed dated 17th, June, 1919, and of record in said Clerk's 
Office in D. B. 254-C, p. 380, conveying the fifty 
page 26 } (50') feet frontage next on the vVest; and subse-
quently sold by the said Selden to the said Martha 
P. Branch. 
Lee Paschall, from Leroy Goldberg, widower, by deed dated 
23d., Apr. 1921, and of record in said Clerk's Office in D. B. 
272-D, p. 276, conveying the sixty (60') feet frontage next , 
adjoining on the West ; 
Kingsland Land Corporation, from John P. Branch, wid .. 
ower, by deed dated 30th, Oct., HH2, and of record in said 
Clerk's office in ·n. B. 219-C, p. 493, conveying a portion of 
said frontage, of which the remaining sixty-four feet and 
eight inches, (6.4' 8") more or less, at the Northeast corner 
of the Boulevard and Monument A ve~ue, is a part; 
And whereas, the said grantees, parties of the second part, 
acquired title to their lot or parcel of said land, fronting on 
the North line of Monument Avenue, and having a frontage 
thereon of ninety-four (94') feet, and adjoining the lot of 
the said Mary E. Miller on the West, and the lot of said Wm. 
H. Schwartzschild on the East, under and by virtue of the 
last will and testament of Walter H. Miles, .deceased, and 
duly admitted to probate in said Chancery Court of the City 
of Richmond, Va., and being the same lot or parcel of land · 
conveyed to the said Walter H. Miles by Arthur L. Straus, 
and wife, by deed dated the 17th Sept., 1918, and of record in 
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. . 
said Clerk's Office in D. B. 250-A, p. 311; but subject, never-
theless, to the same building res.trictions contained and set 
forth in the deed ·of bargain and sale, conveying the same lot 
or parcel of land, from said John P. Branch, wid-
pag·e 27 ~ ower, to the said Arthur L. Straus, dated the 5th 
· Feb. 1912, and of record in said Clerk's Office in 
· D. B. 214-A. p. 463; and, 
Whereas, the said deed of bargain and sale, last above 
mentioned contained and set forth the following building re-
strictions, namely;-
When said land is improved x x there shall not be erected 
more than two dwellings thereon, and that said dwelling 
or dwelling·s shall be erected in conformity with ·the build-
ing line already established by the house now at the corner . , 
of Mulberry Street and Monument A venue, which building 
line is twenty (20') feet distant from the North line of Monu-
ment 'Avenue; meaning thereby, that the furthest projection, 
(not including·· open porch or necessary steps of any build-
ing·) shall not be nearer than twenty (20') feet to the North 
line of Monume11t Avenue; and that a strip of land, not-les~ 
than five (5') feet wide on the East side of the most Eastern 
of said dwellings, and a strip of land, not less than five (5') 
feet wide on the West side of the ·most Western of said dwell-
ings, x x x are to be left vacant; with the privilege to the 
party of the second part, or assigns, of. building one dwelling· 
on said lot and of leaving gTeater strips of land unimproyed 
on the East and West Sides of said dwelling. 
And whereas, the said grantees, parties of the second part, 
having agreed and contracted to sell their said lot or parcel 
of land, with the buildings and improvements thereon, desig-
nated as No. 2708 Monument Avenue, on investigation of 
the title being made, on behalf of the prosp·ective purchaser, 
and a survey of the said premises being made, ( a 
page 28 ~ plat of said survey, made by T. Crawford Redd & 
Bro., dated the 22nd, Sept. 1921, being hereto at-
tached, and is to be recorded as a part of this deed) it is 
claimed that the buildings and improvements now upon the 
said lot of land have been so placed and erected thereon as 
to be in violation of said Quilding restrictions, contained and 
set forth in said deed from said John P. Branch to said Ar-
thur L. Straus, and to encroach slightly upon the property 
adjoining- on the West thereof, as and in the following· men-
tioned particulars, all of which are shown on said plat of said 
survey, hereto attached, namely:-
( a) That the vestibule of the front porch of said premises 
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projects slightly beyond the prescribed twenty {20') foot 
building. line, established on said avenue; and, 
(b) That the second-story bay window., on the West side 
·-0f said premises, projects over a portion of the five ( 5') foot 
strip of land, required to be left vacant on the W e~t side of 
said dwelling; and, 
( c) That the garden wall, and the wall and cornice of tbe 
garage, in tbe rear of said dwelling., encroach slightly upon 
the property adjoining on the West; . . 
And whereas, the said grantors, parties of the first part, 
upon and subject to the co:r:iditions hereinafter set forth, have 
severally ag·reed and' consented that t'~e said premises No. 
2708 Monument Avenue henceforth shall be quietly held aud 
enjoyed by the said grantees, parties of tl1e second part, and 
the assig-ns thereof, without any lawful interference or in-
terruption, on the part of the said grantors, or any of ,either 
of them, on the ground or by reason of the fact, if so it be, 
that the said buildings and improvements, or any 
page 29 '} part or portion thereof, are not wholly wit~in the 
true property lines of said lot, or that the said 
buildings and improvements, or any part or portion thereof, 
encroach upon are are so erected and placed .as to constitute 
a violation or non-observance of said building restrictions, 
Now, therefore, 
This deed wi tnesseth; that, in pursuance of said agreement 
and consent, and for a valuable consideration, severally had 
and received, the said grantors, parties of the first part, each 
for himself, or herself, or itself, as the case may be, do 
hereby covenant, . consent and agree, to and with the said 
grantees, party of the second part, and the assigns thereof, 
that, for and so long as the said buildings and improvements, 
as now erected and placed upon said lot of land, and as shown 
on the said plat hereto attached, shall remain thereon, the 
said alleged encroachments 1;1nd violations or non-observances 
of said building· restrictions shall be and the same are hereby 
permitted, sanctioned and allowed, and the said grantees and 
the assigns thereof are hereby r.eleased and relieved of and 
from any and all damages, demands or claims, of any kind 
whatsoever, in respect thereto; 
But provided always, and upon condition, that no other or 
further encroachments or violations or non-observances of 
said building· restrictions shall be had, made or permitted, by 
the said grantees of the assigns thereo ; and that, if and when 
the said buildings and improvements, or any part thereof as 
to which it is now claimed, as aforesaid, constitute an en-
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croachment or violation of said building restrie-
page 30 ~ tions, at any time hereafter, are pulled down or 
removed, then and in that case, any other build-
ing·s or improvements, erected or placed upon the said lot of 
land, shall be erected and placed within the true property 
lines of said lot, and the same, and each and every part 
thereof, shall conform to and observe in all respects and par-
ticulars the said building restrictions. 
In testimony whereof, the said grantos, parties of the first 
part, being 'individuals, have hereunto severally set their 
hands and sealsi and the said Kingsland Land Corporation 
has caused ~this instrument to be signed, executed and de-
livered,· ill~ it_s name and on its behalf, as its act and deed, 
by its Presiient, and its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed 
and attested by its Secretary; accordingly, witness the fol-
lowing signatures and seals, the day and year first herein 
above written;-
WILLIAM H. SCHW ARZSCHILD, 
ROSALIE H. SCHWARZSCHILD, 
WILLIAM P. WOOD .. 
SUDIE RUCKER WOOD, 
ELSIE BOYD TUCKER, 
BEVERLY R. TUCKER, 
LEE PASCHALL, 
EDITH L. PASCHALL, 
• MARY E. MILLER, 
ESSIE S~ LABENBERG, 
MARTHA P. BRANCH, 
M. C. BRANCH, 
page 31 ~ KINGSLAND LA.ND CORPORATION, 




1912 Richmond Va 
Attest: 
ROBERT G. CABELL, Secretary .. 
State of Virginia, 













I, Holt Page, a Notary Public, within and for the Citv 
afo1·esaid, in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify that Wm. 
Rosalie H. Schwarzschild, et al., v. Myrtle A. Welborne. 37 
H. Schwarzschild, and Rosalie H. Schwarzschild, whose names 
are signed to the foregoing writing·, bearing date the 1st day 
of October, A. D. 1921, have severally acknowledged the same 
before me, in my City aforesaid; and I further certify that 
my term of office as Notary Public expires the 9, day of Mch. 
A. D. 1925. 





State of Virginia, 
. City of Richmond, to-wit: 
HOLT PAGE, 
Notary Public. 
I, Milton J·. Beirne, a Notary Public, within and for the 
City aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify 
that J. Kerr Branch, and Robt. G. Cabell, whose names, as 
President and Secretary respectively, of the Kingsland Land 
Corporation, are signed to the foregoing wdting, bearing date 
the 1st day of October, A. D. 1921, have severally acknowl-
edged the same before me, in my City aforesaid; 
page 32 ~ and I further certify that my term of office as 
Notary Public, expires the 7th day of Apr., 1922 . 
. Given under my band this 28th day of October, 1921. 
MILTON J. BEIRNE, 
N otar.y Public. 
State of Virginia, . 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
I, J. R. Wilson, a Notary Public, within and for the City 
aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify that 
Lee Paschall and Edith L. Paschall his wife, whose names 
are signed to the foregoing writing, bearing date the 1st day 
of October, 1921, have severally acknowledged the same be-
fore ·me in my City aforesaid, and I further certify that my 
. term of office expires the 25th day of January, 1922. 
Given under my hand this 12th day of October, 1921. 
J. R. WILSON, 
Notary Public. 
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· State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
I, T~os. C. Gordon, _a commissioner in Chancery of the 
Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, do cer-
tify that Mary E. Miller, whose name is signed to the fore-
going· writing, beari.ng date the 1st day of October, 1921, has 
acknowledged the same before me in my City aforesaid. 
Given under my hand this 12th day of October, 1921. 
page 33 ~ State of Virginia, 
THOS. C. GORDON, 
Commissioner in Chancery. 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
I, :Milton J. Beirne, a Notary Public, within and for the City 
aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify that 
Martha P. Branch and M. C. Branch, her husband, whose 
names are signed to the foregoing· writing·, bearing date the 
1st day of October, A. D. 1921, have i:;everally acknowledged 
the same before me, in rpy City aforesaid; and, I further cer-
tofy that my term of office as Notary Public., expires the 7th 
day of April, A. D. 1922. 
Given under my hand this 7th day of November, 1921. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
MILTON J. BEIRNE, 
Notary Public. 
I, J. M. darter, Jr., a Notary Public within and for the City 
aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify that 
William P. Wood, Sudie Rucker Wood, Elsie Boyd Tucker, 
Beverley· R. Tucker and Essie S. Labenberg, whose names 
are sig-ned to the foregoing writing, bearing date the 1st day 
of October, 1921, have severally acknowledged the same be-
fore me in my City aforesaid, and I further certify that my 
term of office expires the 19th day of November, 1923. 
Given under my hand tl1is 9th day of November, 1921. 
page 33% ~ 
Plat Comes here-See Manuscript. 
J.M. CARTER, JR., 
Notary Public. 
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MONUMENT A VENUE 
Plat of No. 2708 on North side of Monument Avenue be-
tween Mulberry Street; and the Boulev.ard, in the City of 
Richmond, Va. 
Scale 1"-. 20' 
Sept. 22, 1921. 
T. CRAWFORD REDD & BRO 
Surveyors & Engineers 
page 34 ~ City of Richmoncl, to-wit: 
In the Office of the Court of Chancery for said City, the 
10th day of November., 1921 . 
. This deed .was presented, and, with the Certificates & Plat 
annexed, admitted to record at 4 :45 o'clock P. M. 
page 35} 
Virginia: 
Teste: CHAS. 0. SA VILLE, Clerk. 
A Copy, 
Teste: A. T. AUGUST, Clerk. 
(Filed September 26, 1946.). 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Elsie Boyd Tucker, et als., Complainants, 
v. 
Myrtle A. W elborne, Defendant. 
OPINION. 
This suit was orig'inally instituted by Elsie Boyd Tucker, 
Sudie R. Wood, Anne J. Scott, Rosalie H. Schwarzschild, 
Thomas B. Gay, Anne B. Boykin and Lee Paschall.~ complain-
ants, against Myrtle A. ·w elborne, def e11dant. It seeks to 
enjoin her from the alleged violation of a restrictive covenant 
contained in a deed to her predecessor in title conveying the 
hereinafter mentioned parcel of real estate. After maturity 
of the cause, Alice Boyd Tucker and Sudie R .. Wood, moved 
to be allowed to withdraw as parties complainant and such 
motion was g·ranted by decree of December 28, 1945. 
The complainants-that is all of the original complainants 
-own lots and d~ellings designated 2700-2702-2704-2710-
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2712- 2714 and 2716 Monument Avenue, and also a vacant Jot 
just west of 2716 Monument A venue. • The defendant is the 
owner of premises numbered 2708 Monument A.venue, which 
consists of the lot on which the dwelling is erected and a 
rather spacious side yard or lawn adjoining the dwelling on 
the east. The building is described as being a larg·e handsome 
dwelling containing twelve bedrooms and seven baths. The 
·. side yard or lawn is well kept and part used. as a 
page 36 } rose garden. The properties owned by the several . 
origin~! complainants and the defe~dant comprise 
the entire frontage on the north side of Monument Avenue 
from Mulberry Street on the east to the Boulevard, on the 
west. Defendant's lot and dwelling, is in, or very near, the 
center of the block, as it fronts on Monument A venue. John 
P. Branch, was formerly the owner in fee simple of all of the 
reat estate on which these several dwellings are located, and 
all of the owners derive their titles throug·h or from him as a 
common grantor. · 
The bill alleges that about the year 1909 John P. Branch 
and his successor in title, King·sland Land Corporation, con-
ceived and established a general plan to rreate a highly re-
stricted residential block where thPse dwellings are located. 
That the premises now owned by complainants and the de-
fendant were comreyed to them or their predecessors in title 
by deeds containing covenants for the purpose of' creating-
'and maintaining a highly restricted residential block. The 
bill further states that Myrtle A. vVelborne acquired 2708 
Monument Avenue by m.esne·conveyances from A. L. Straus 
who had been deeded the same bv John P. Branch on Febru-
ary 5, 1912. That A. L. Straus was a signatory to such deed 
and had bound himself, Ms heirs, assigns, etc., to forever ob-
serve the following covenants and restrictions set out in such 
deed, viz: 
"It is covenanted and agreed by the party of the second 
part that no part of the said land shall be sold, leased or 
other.wise disposed of at any time hereafter to any person who 
is a nee;ro or of African descent. 
"It 1s further covenanted ahd agreed that when the said 
land is improved by the said party of the second part, or his 
executors, administrators, l1eirs, devisees or as-
page 37 ~ signs, there shall not be erected more than two (2) 
dwellings thereon, and that the said dwelling or 
dwellings shall be erected in conformity with the building line 
as already established by the house now at the corner of 
Mulberry Street and Monument A venue, which building line . 
is Twenty Feet (20') distant from the North line of Monu-
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ment Avenue, meaning thereby that the furthest projection 
(not including open porch or necessary steps of any build~ 
ing) shall not be nearer than Twenty Feet (20') to the North 
line of Monument .Avenue, and that a strip of land not less 
than Five Feet ( 5') wide on the East side of the most eastern 
of said dwellings, and a strip of land, not less than Five 
Feet ( 5') wide on the West· side of the most western of said 
dwellings, and a strip of land not less than Ten Feet (10') 
wide. between the two said dwellings are to be left vacant, 
with the privilege to the party of the second part or assigns 
of building one (1) dwelling on said lot and of leaving 
greater strips of land unimproved on the East and West sides 
of said dwelling. 
'' The party of the second _part covenants and agrees .that 
if the said l~md is improved, such improvements shall be a 
dwelling or two dwellings, and that such dwelling shall be 
expensive as the adjoining dwelling ( on the East) on this 
block, which covenants and. restrictions are accepted as part 
of the considerations of this deed and are to run with the 
land. · 
"The party of the first part covenants and agrees that in 
selling the land on the Yv est he will place thereon a restric-
tion as to the same building lines and the vacancy of the 
Five F'eet (5') immediately adjoining on the West the above 
described land, but not restricting as to the size of the lots 
on the ,vest of the said land conveyed by this deed. 
:i. * * (English covenants) 
"The party of the second part accepts the conditions of 
this deed and by joining· in these presents hereby binds him-
self, his heirs, devisees, executors, administrators., personal 
representatives and assig·ns forever.'' 
The bill alleges that defendant acquired the property with 
notice 9f the restrictions imposed upon it, and has since .J anu-
ary 5th, 1945, violated said covenants by the operation of a 
boarding house, lodging house and public restaurant at 2708 
Monument Ave. It asserts that the complainants 
page 38 ~ as the owners of other lots in the 2700 block l\f onu-
ment Avenue are entitled to enforce the restric-
tions in the deed from John P. Branch to A. L. Straus, and 
prays for an injiinction restraining the defendant from op-
eratin&· a boarding house, lodging.house or public restaurant 
on sucll· premises, and that she be limited to the use of the 
42 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
premises only as a dwelling for residential purposes. No. dam-
age is alleged, and the bill is one strictly asking enforcement of 
the complainant's rights under the covenant. It does not assert 
that any damage or harm has been caused the complainants 
by the use to which the. defendant has put the dwelling, or 
~hat their properties have been caused to depreciate in value. 
The defendant appeared and filed an answer to the bill, in 
her answer she asserts that she acquired this property at the 
cost of $32.,500.00, and a(lmits that the hereinbefore recited 
covenants are contained in the deed from John P. Branch 
to A. L. Straus, her predecessor in title. The defendant in 
parag-raph 6 of her answer admits that since January 5th, 
1945, she has had others than herself living upon the prem-
ises. That paragraph of her answer is as follows: 
'' ( 6) Your respondent admits the ownership., subject to the 
deed of trust herein before mentioned, of the premises No. 
2708 Monument ~t\. venue and that since January 5, 1945, she 
has had others tlian herself living at these premises: but in no 
sense .of the word has she conducted a boarding house, a lodg-
ing house or public restaurant, in the common acceptance of 
these terms, although there is nothing in said restrictions 
hetetofore ref erred to to prevent her from doing so if she so 
desired, and sl1e calls for strict proof of the viola-
page 39 ~ tion of any covenants as charged.'' 
The answer further asserts that 2708 Monument Avenue is 
a larg·e three story dwelling containing twelve bedrooms; 
that due to the recent war and othe'r conditions an acute 
housing shortage did and still does exist in Richmond. That 
this particular neighborhood was in July, 1943, rezoned by 
the Council of the City of Richmond from strictly residential 
property to what is known as "E Multiple Family ·District". 
And though .such proposed rezoning was extensively adver-
tised no one of the complainants appeared in objection there-
to. The answer admits that three couples and two single 
ladies other than the defendant, dwell at 2708 Monument 
Avenue, and are there with the idea of making their stay 
permanent so long as their bmdnesses permit. Paragraph 7 
of the answer asserts that the defendant does not acacept over-
. night guests, .nor furnish meaJs. It is finally contended that 
the above acts and conduct on the part of the defendant are 
not violative of the covenant, but that sbe is merely using 
the premises for residential and dwelling· purposes. No 
depositions have· been taken but counsel filed stipulations of 
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fact, the pertinent· parts of which are to the following effect: 
. That since July 19, 1945, Elsie Boyd Tucker, one of the 
original complainants in this causeJ who resides at 2700 Monu-
ment Avenue has been renting four rooms.. That the defend-
.ant and Elsie Boyd Tucker are the only ones in the 2700 
block who take roomers or boarders. 
That until the defendant purchased 2708 Monument Ave-
nue it had only been used as a private residence .. 
page 40 ~ It app·ears that numerous apartment buildings 
are in the 2700 block West Grac.e Street, the 2800 
block Monument A venue and also on the Boulevard adjacent 
to this block. 
That this block has been recently rezoned as "ID Multiple 
Family District". And the defendant applied to the proper 
city authorities and received a certificate allowing· h~r resi-
dence to be used as a boarding house; that defendant on Feb-
ruary 4, 1945, also obtained from the Commissioner of Reve-
nue of the City of Richmond a license to operate her }lremises 
during the year 1945 as '' a hotel~' of twelve r.o~ms and seven 
baths. That certain alterations have been made in the in-
terior of the residence and one shower. installed. on the third 
floor. · 
That from January 5, 1945, to May 3, 1945, the defendant 
at times inserted in the newspapers the following advertise-
ment: 
'' M01\TU1\1:El\TT A VE.-An ideal home for those away from 
the comforts of their own. RoQm with or without bath. Meals 
that satisfy. 4-3300. '' 
which appeared in the classified advertisements of the Rich-
mond News-Leader and the Richmond Times-Dispatch under 
t11e heading 
''Rooms with Meals 99;" 
That the de.fendant was unable to obtain a telephone under 
the war conditions existing and applied for the same for "a 
hotel" and so obtained the same and it is so listed in the 
telephone directory. . 
That since .r aliuary 5, 1945, she has rented rooms in her 
house to others as set forth in paragraph 7 of the def end-
ant ;s answer; and that she has since January 5, 1945, served 
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meals to persons who rented rooms in her home 
page. 41 ~ although she is not serving meals at the present 
time to such persons. 
The complainants, among other cases, rely upon the two 
Virginia decisions of Tflhitehurst v. Bu1·gess, 130 Va. 572, and 
Dietrick v. Leadbetter, 175 Va. 170, as controlling of the ques-
tion at issue. 
The defenses relied upon are that (a) there is no mutuality 
be.tween the complainants and defendant upon which the com-
plaintiffs are entitled to enforce the covenant; (b) upon a fair 
and res~onable construction of the covenants the use to which 
the defendant has put the premises does not constitute a viola-
tion of the same; ( c} that the changed conditions of the 
neighborhood and acute. housing shortage render it inequi-
table and against public policy to now enforce this covenant~ 
and (d) though there is found to be a violation of the letter 
of the covenant., yet the violation is of no real or material 
damage to the complainants, and to grant the injunction here 
prayed for would be well nigh destructive of the value of de-
fendant's property. That this inequity is emphasized and 
made more compelling ·by the fact that one of the origina] 
complainants has recently determined to and is using her 
residence to house several parties not members of. her imme-
diate household and upon a balance of equities the relief 
prayed for should be denied. 
The ~efendant contends tl1at the covenants, facts and s11r-
rounding circumstances of this case are materially different 
from those presented and considered in 1Vhiteh.urst v. Bur-
gess, supra, and Dietrick v. Leallbetter, supra. That those 
cases are therefore not controlling of the one at hand. She 
relies upon 8tC1.1enson v. Spi,1Jey, 132 Va. 115, and 
page 42 ~ additional cases from this and other states, hav-
ing to do with construction of covenants and. build-
ing restrictions, as well as changed conditions in the neigh-
borhood. Also cases dealing with balance of equities be-
tween the parties litigant are presented to the court, to show 
that under the circumstances of this suit it would be highlv 
inequitable to award the injunctive relief here soug·lit. ·· 
It is further asserted by respondent that the. restriction is 
in derogation of the rig·ht of free and unrestricted use of 
property, and in case of doubt must, therefore, be construed 
against the grantor. It should not be taken to exclude any 
use not plainly prohibited, nor should it be extended bv im-
plication. " 
The complainants assert that the court should give effect 
to the intention of the parties in enforcing the restriction. 
Rosalie H. Schwarzschild, et al., v. Myrtle A. Welborne. 45 
That the plain intent was to limit the use as well as. prescribe 
the character of building. (Italics supplied.) 
The covenant expressly prohibits the erection of anything 
other than a dwelling or two dwellings. Is there anything in 
that covenant which precludes the use by the grantee of such 
dwelling for the occupancy of roomers Y .. A •. nd if so may such 
restriction be enforced by these complainants 7 
Considering first the matter of mutuality ;-the right of 
these complainants,, who were not the grantees in the original 
deed, to seek and have the injunctive relief prayed .for. It 
is obvious from an inspection of that instrument, that no such 
mutuality originally existed. However under the deed of cor-
rection, the admissions in the answer and stipula-
page 43 ~ tions of fact, mutuality does exist. That is the 
· right now rests in these complainants to petition 
the court for any relief that tbe orig'inal grantor was entitled 
to. The wording of the covenant makes it clear that in the 
first instance the grantor alone could have enforced it against 
his several grantees and their a8sig·ns. It C'ould not have been 
enforced by one or more grantee against another. It was 
originally for the gTantor 's benefit alone. However the deed 
of correction, being an agreement between the several parties, 
stablished the right to and between each of them to have re-
lief for any violation of the covenant which had previously 
resided solely in the original grantor. 
Does the use to which the defendant now puts the premises 
violate the terms of the covenant which provides that ''there 
shall not be erected more than two ( 2) dwellings thereon'', 
and '' if the land is improved such improvement shall be a 
dwelling or two dwellings * * • '' ·y . There is no objection 
made as to the construction or location of tl1e improvements, 
nor is it contended that there is anv violation of the cove-
nant in any manner other than by the use to which the dwell-
ing is devoted. 
The terms of the restriction in lVhitehwrst v. Bwrgess, 
supra, is clearer and more explicit than the one in the case at 
hand. The languag·e there used was: * * • '' that two adjoin-
ing lots will constitute a. building site for one residence only, 
except on Surry crescent and Atlantic boulevard, south of 
· Hanover avenue, where four adjoining lots will constitute a 
buildings site for one residence only, and on ,vestmoreland 
and Buckingham avenues, where three adjoining 
page 44 } lots will constitute a building site for one residence 
only''~ 
The defendant undertook to erect a store. He asserted that 
the above language was of doubtful meaning and therefore 
did not inhibit the use of the land for other tl1an residential 
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purposes. It was contended that restrictions against the free 
use and disposition of property are not favored and should 
be strlctly construed. The Court however was of opinion that 
the intention of the parties had been to establish a residential 
area. That the covenant, if it did not by express terms ex-
clude the erection of stores, did so by necessary implication. 
That construction of the covenant upon the facts was and is 
so clearly justified that it is difficult to conceive of its having 
been questioned in the first instance. 
The use to which the residence was put in the case of 
Deitrick v. Leadbetter, si1pra, was determinative of the ques-
tion at issue. (Italics supplied.) In Whitehttrst v. Bitr,qess, 
supra, the physical structure., its location and use were all 
clearly violative of the covenant. Therefore the Deitrick-
Leadbetter case is more to the point on the case at hand 
than is Whitehwrst v. B1trgess. 
The covenants in question in Deitr-ick v. Leadbetter, s·itvra, 
are as follows: '' That no part of said premises 01· of the 
building that may ·be erected thereon, shall be used for any 
purpose or in any manner that will create a nuisance, or make 
such use of said premises injurious or offensive to a good resi-
dential neig·hborhood. '' 
'' That said land sha11 not be used except for residential 
purposes.'' 
page 45 ~ · The owner undertook to alter her residence bv 
adding some rooms and a bath and to use it as a 
tourist home. The complainants sought and obtained an in-
junction against such action and use. Upon affirmation of 
that decision l)y the Supreme Court of Appeals the following 
was said. "But if it is a business then this lot is not being 
used for 'residential _purposes only' ". That it is a business . 
cannot be seriously questioned• * *". ''Boarding houses are 
not private residences, and, on principle, it makes no differ-
ence if a boarder stays one day or two :r, ·* *''. And the Court 
further says: ''Tl10se who conduct taverns, hotels and board-
ing houses .may live in them, but can it be said that they a.re 
not 'used except for residential purposes' ". 
One of the above covenants is clearlv restrictive as to use 
and this is expressed in explicit terms. It forbids the use 
except for residential vu-rposes. · (Italics supplied.) 
In the present case the covenant is not. so restrictive un-
less it be by implication. It provides what tlle improvements 
shall consist of, but it does not undertake to expressly limit 
their use. The inhibition of its present use, if such exists, 
rests wholly within the realm of implication. The difficulty is 
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in the determination of the scope of the implication. The 
intent of the parties should be· soug·ht and if possible the pur-
pose of the covenant ascertaim:~d. W'hile on the other hand 
the principle that restrictions upon the free use and aliena-
tion of real estate should not be lightly implied is likewise to 
be kept in mind. It is earnestly contended that the building 
is still a dwelling· within the meaning of the cove-
page 46} nant when used as stich by the owner, though., in 
addition, partially or incidentially devoted to busi-
ness purposes. I ts physical construction and appearance, as 
well as that of the yard and grounds, is still strictly tl1at of a 
dwelling·. However its use is not limited to that of a dwelling 
cnly. It is used for something other than a dwelling, i. e., 
the business of a room~ng house. 
The text of the covenants and_ restrictions are expressly 
directed towards the character, costs and location of the build-
ing or buildings. Only by implication is the use limited, with 
the exception of the provisions or restriction regarding the 
sale to_ a negro. That is a restriction upon the future action 
of the owner with regard to the alienation of the property. 
As the covenant in the case at hand is not so .clearly or ex-
plicitly restrictive of the use of the building as the covenants 
imposed in the cases of Whitehurst v. Biirgess, supra, and 
Deitrick v. Leadbetter, supra, the Court is not constrained 
to conclude that those cases or either of them are wholly de: 
terminative of the question presented. 
In the case of Etterick v. Leicht Real Esta.te Company, 130 
Va. 224, certain building restrictions were unif ormily placed 
in the deeds conveying all lots in the area in question. The 
several grantees united therein and agreed to the covenants. 
The fact-s establish that the complainant was engaged in de-
veloping a strictly residential section. The restrictions or 
covenants pe.:Hinent to .the cas.e are the three set forth next 
below. 
''Fifth-Not more than one house, out-building 
l)age 47 }. excepted, shall be erected or placed upon said prop-
erty, except in conformity to the building line es-
tablished by the said company, nor shall any house or any 
part thereof, except outside steps, be erected or placed within 
fifteen feet of tl1e front of any lot shown on said plat. 
"Sixth-No flat roofed or double house, storehouse, fac-
tory building or apartment house sl1all be erected or placed 
upon the property hereby conveyed, nor shall it be used for 
commercial or manufacfuring purposes. 
"Seventh-No residence shall be erected 01: placed upon 
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the property hereby conveyed to cost less than four· thou-
sanad ($4,000) dollars, and no house shall be erected.or place(l 
upon said property so as to throw the rear part thereof to-
ward the side of any adjoining lot, and for a period of ten 
years from January first, 1910,. all dwelling houses erectecl 
upon said property shall be built according to plans sub-
mitted to the directors of said company and approved by 
them.'' ' 
The c<>ntention made by the complainant is bl'iefly stated 
by the f oll,pwihg recital on pag·e 229: '' The bill quotes the 
sixth and seventh clauses of the restrictions or conditions in 
the deed and/alleges that the defendants had commenced the-
erection on said lot of a dwelling house according to certain 
plans, of which copies were filed with the bill, and that the 
erection of such borne on such lot would be in violation of the 
sixth clause of said restrictions or conditions, in that such 
house would be a double-house or. an apartment house.'' 
.After reciting certain facts the Court has this 
page 48 · ~ to say on page 230: '' The primary question in iR-
sue between the parties -plaintiff and defendant is 
whether such a house is an apartment house within the mean-
ing of the sixth covenant af~resaid in the deed; it not being 
contended for the plaintiff that the proof shows that such a 
house is a double house.'' 
.As heretofore stated the facts in tllat case established that 
it was a strictly residential development. That is, the loh; 
were limited to use for erection of dwellings or resi.dences 
only. On page 240 the Court emphatically declares that tbis 
was a high class residential suburb of Norfolk city. It use.cl 
this language: '' • * ~ the restriction with respect to prohi-
bition of the erection of apartment houses was in furtherance 
of the undertaking which the plaintiff- had entered into to de-
velop Winona as a high class residential suburb of Norfolk 
City." . 
The Court made permanent the injunction forbidding the-
erection of the building contemplated which was a two family 
apartment house. Yet it places its approval upon tlle use 
of the dwellings or residences by more than one family. It 
rests its decision primarily upon the character of the struc-
ture and not the use. After reciting on page 230 that this 
high class residential section, limited to residences alone, 
contained more than one· family in fifty per cent of the houses, 
it approves such ·use as not being .a violation of the cove-
nants fifth and sixth. This approval is set forth on pag-e 
240 in the following lang·uage : '' • e • the restriction with 
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respect to prohibition of the erection of apartment houses was . 
in furtherance of the undertaking which the plain-
page 49 ~ tiff had entered into to develop Winona as a high 
class residential suburb of Norfolk city." • * • 
"Further: We think that when the sixth clause aforesaid 
is read in the light of the circumstances disclosed by the tes-
timony of the defendants themselves and by the other evi-
dence in the cause, which is· set forth or referred to in the 
statement preceding this opinion, it is plain that the words 
'' apartment house'" were used in such clause, not with the 
meaning· that the defendants might erect a building such as 
was the one exceptional building then existing in Winona, 
known as the 'Neff' residence, which was a two-family apart-
ment house ; but with the meaning that the defendant were 
not to erect such a house, although they would be permitted 
to erect a house of the same character as that of the presi-
dent of the plaintiff company, and of all the other large dwell-
ing· houses then existing in Winona, narnely, a hoitse la-rger 
tlw1n nec.essary for one fam·ily, but which would not be con-
structed with any separate apart11ien.ts s-u,ita.ble for the ,zu;e of 
more than, one famiily." (Italics supplied.) 
The grantees were here allowed to use their residences for 
other than '' residential purposes'' within the strict interpre-
tation of those words. And this was done when the deed and 
covenants established a mutuality between the grantor and 
the grantees which did not exist in the first instance in the 
case at hand. 
Clause Fifth quoted ·above, limited the grantees to the erec-
tion of one house, and Clause Sixth, when read hi the light of 
the other · twelve recited covenants limited the use of that 
house to resident1al purposes. Yet the parties and the Cqurt 
construed such covenants as allowing mo.re than 
page 50 ~ one family to 1·eside or dwell therein. On page 
240 and 241 the Court declares that the defendant 
could erect "a house larger than necessary for one family 
which might be occupied by more than one family, but which 
could not be constructed with any separate apartments suit-
able for the use of more than one family".· 
In 18 A. L. R., page 441, will be found an extensive anno-
tation of this case. These numerous cases are cited which 
undertake to determine the meaning of the various phrases 
sucl1 as '' Private Dwelling * • "" " "Residential purposes 
only * * ~ " "A residence only * * * '' "Single dwelling house, 
*:,. * * '' and '' Private residence''. Some of these cases in 
CO·nstming the restrictions hinge upon the character of the 
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structure and some upon the use to which the buil~ing is put. 
But none go so far as to hold that a restriction that limits 
the erection of a dwelling to a lot, prohibits the owner from 
receiving roomers therein. Probably the most restrictive de-
cision as to both the use and structure of the building is 
Paris v. Reedy, 113 N. E. 782. This is a Massachusetts case 
decided in 1916 and cited by counsel for complainant in the 
brief presented to the Court. In this case it was held that · 
the restriction- "But one dwelling house shall be erected 
thereon'' does not permit of more than one dwelling under 
a single roof or the erection o'f a sti~ucture designed to in-
clude more than one. And it also defines the use to which 
the dwelling may be put. It will, however, upon a careful 
examination of this case be seen that the decision actually 
rests more upon the character of the structure than upon the 
· · m;e to which it is devoted. 
·page 51 ~ As illustrative of the view that the scope· of the 
restriction should not be extended by implication 
is the case of Hwn.t v. Held, ·go Ohio St. 280; 107 N. E. 765. 
Here it was held that the restriction-''This property ii; 
sold for residence purposes only' '-did not preclude the erec-
tion of a two-family or double house. Also see Arnoff v. 
W-illiarns, 113 N. E. 661; Voohees v. Blum, 113 N. E. 593. 
· Without as yet determining the scope of the implication 
of the restriction in the case at hand, the Court will consider 
the additional defenses relied upon, i. e., that the changed 
condition of the neig·bborhood and the acute shortage of hous-
ing facilities render it against public policy to enforce the 
provisions of the covenant, even though it be found to for-
bid by implication the use to which the premises are now 
· put. And, lastly, the contention that no dar;nage being estab-
lished or proved, the granting of the relief prayed for would 
so seri~usly injure the defendant as to be out of all propor-
tion to the benefit accruing to the complainants, and there-
fore the Court should refuse the injunction. 
The stipulations and exhibits disclose that there is some 
change in the neighborhood. Boarding houses, rooming 
l10uses and other businesses. are rapidly surrounding .and are 
now adjacent to this area. However, this particular block 
has been and is free from such businesses, except for the de-
fendant's alleged undertaking and the recent use of the home 
of one of the former complainants. While these encroaching 
businesses are in fact not far removed, yet if this· covenant 
be i·estrictive of the present use, it could not be 
page 52 ~ said that the changed conditions destroy its pur-
pose and object. De.it rick v. Leadbe.tter,. supra; 
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Rombait£r v~ Comvton H e·iglits Church, 328 Mo .. 1; 40 S. W. 
(2nd) 545, 553. 
Thoug·h there is a housing shortage in this city such is 
merely a temporary matter and does not, in the- opinion of 
the Court, render it against public policy to enforce the pro-
visions of this covenant. The injunction if issued might en~. 
tail some hardship to the owners and occupants of this build- . 
ing, yet such temporary discomforts as would ensue do not 
render the enforcement of an equitable right such as this 
ag·ainst public policy. 
The two last above mentioned defenses, i. e., the acute 
housing shortage and changed condition of the neighbor-
hood, do not justify the refusal of an injunction if the com- · 
plainants are otherwise entitled to the same. 
Should the Court conclude that the use to which the prop· 
erty is now put falls within the restrictive provision of the 
covenant it is still insisted that the issuance of an· injunction 
would be so damaging to the defendant when considered with 
regard to the benefit derived by the complainants that the 
relief asked for should be denied. Several cases to this effect 
are presented to the Court. C,heatham v. Taylor, 148 Va. 26; 
Springer v. Gedcly, 172 Va. 533·; 29 Amer .. Jur., page 250; 
Sec. 54. 
As heretofore stated there is no assertion in the bill of 
complaint nor is any evidence. offered that any damage has 
accrued to the complainants. The injunction is sought upon 
the terms of the covenant without regard to whether damages 
have ensued or not. 
pag·e 53 } It is stated in Davidson v. Taylor, 196 Mich. 605, 
162 N. W. 1033, that the award of an injunction 
in such a case ''is not a matter of absolute rig·ht, but is gov-
erned by the same general rules which control _equitable re-
lief by specific performance". While the Court is not un-
mindful of the principle that a party is usually entitled to 
enforce a legal right established by contract witl1out regard 
to a balance of equities, yet if the actual use is not materially 
detrimental to the complainants a limited discretion rests in 
the chancellor, as recited in Davidson v. Taylor, supra, and 
the same should not be enforced to the severe detriment of 
the defendant. 
The Court has concluded that the injunction sought should 
not be awarded. The use to which the defendant has put 
the premises. for the last several months as disclosed by the 
stipulations of fact is not violative of the terms of tbe cove-
nant. To hold that it was prohibited by the covenant would 
necessarily be done solely by implication. The Court is un-
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willing to e~tend by implication the terms of this restriction 
so as to prohibit the use to which the premises are now de-
voted. Such is not required by the decision of Deitrick v. 
Leadbetter,. supra. And to do so would stretch the oovenan t 
to and beyond the breaking point. If this interpretation of 
the covenant is correct such disposes of this cause. How-
ever, in addition, the Court is of opinion that under all tbt? 
facts and. ci:rcumstances of this case the damage that woukl 
be sustained. by the defendant, should the injunction issue, is 
so out of proportion to the benefits derived by the complain-
ants that it would be inequitable to award the-
page 54 ~ satne. Daviilsor,. v. Taylor, sitpra. It is fortified 
in this position by tbe recent action of one of the 
original complainants in herself allowing her premises to be 
oQeupied by several persous in the same manner that the de-
fendaut 1·eceives xoomers at her home. When this suit wfls 
instituted she was a litigant on the side of and making com-
U\Q:U cause with the pl~esent complainants. Today she is 
factually in a similar positiou as the defendant, and this by 
. choice. This is quite convincing that the damage to the de-
f enclant if the injunction was issued would be out of propor-
tion to the benefit to the complainants. 
The refusal of the injunction is however limited to the 
use to which the. premises are now actually put as recited i11 
the stipulations and is not to be taken as allowing the en-
largement. in any manner by the defendant of the activitie~ 
to wbioh the dwelling· is now devoted .. 
WILLIS D. MILLER. 
7/25/46 .. 
pag·e 55 ~ ..And now at this day, to.wit: At a La~ and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, held the 
26th day of September, 1946. 
This cause came on this day to be heard upon the com-
plainants' bill; upon the answer of the det'eudaut to ~aid 
bill and. general 1·eplioation thereto; upon the original w1·it-
tne.. stipula.tion of facts dated November 29, 1945, and sup-
ple.mental stip\lla.tion tllereto dated January 17, 1946, nnu 
the exhibits therewith all now duly filed and ,111 mad~ a p.art 
of the reGord in this .cause; and upon argument of counsel. 
Upon consideration of all of which, the Court is of opinion 
and doth decide that the use and occupancy since January· 5, 
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1945, of the premises known as No. 2708 Monument Ave-
nue, Richmond, Virgfoia, by the defendant for the purpose 
and in the manner set forth in the stipulations of fact do not 
constitute a violation of nor are violative of any of the terms 
of the resfrictive covenants pertaining thereto as contained 
in the deed from John P. Brai;ich to A. L. Straus, dated Feb~ 
ruary 5, 1912, and recorded in Deed Book 214-A, page 463, 
· Richmond Chancery Court, and as supplemented by the deed 
of October 1st, 1921, between Beverly R. Tucker, et als., and 
Virginia Trust Company, et als.; and further that under all 
the facts and circumstances of this case the damage that 
would be sustained by the defendant, should the injunction 
issue, is so out of proportion to the benefits to be derived 
by the complatnants that it would be inequitable to award 
the same, all of which is fully set forth in a writ-
page 56 ~ ten opinion of the Court dated July 25, 1946, and 
filed· with and made a part of the record in this 
cause. It is, therefore, adjudged, ordered and decreed that 
tne relief. sought by the said com~lainants is hereby refused 
and denied and the said plaintiffs showing no sufficient cause 
why said bill should not be dismissed, it is therefore ad-
judged, ordered and decreed that tbe said bill be and the same 
is hereby dismissed, and that tbe defendant do recover of . 
the plaintiffs her cost about her defense in this behalf ex-
pended. · 
The plainti_ffs objected to the entry of this decree and hav-
ing signified their desire to present a petition for an appeal 
. from this decree to the Supreme· Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, the Court doth further order and decree that upon the 
plaintiffs, or someone for them, givir~g a bond within ten days 
. from the date of this decree, in the penal sum of $500.00, with 
security approved by the Clerk of the Court payable and con-
ditioned according to law, the foregoing· decree shall there-
upon stand suspended for a period of ninety days. 
page 57 ~ And at this day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity 
· Court of the City of Richmond, held the 5th day 
of October, 1946. 
On motion of the complainants by counsel and with the 
consent of the defendant by counsel the decree herein of Sep-
tember 26, 1946, is hereby amended to allow the plaintiffs to 
give a bond under Section 6351 of the Code of Virginia as 
well as under Section 6338. 
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pag·e 58 ~ I, Luther Libby, Jr., Clerk of the Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, do hereby 
certify that the foregoing is a true transcript of the record 
in the above entitled cause wherein Elsie Boyd TU<;ker, Sudie 
R. Wood, Anne J. Scott, Rosalie H. Schwarzschild, Thoma~ 
B. Gay, Anna B. Boykin and Lee Paschall,.are complainant8, 
and Myrtle A. W el borne, defendants, and that the complain-
ants liave executed a suspending bond conditioned as re-
quired for a supersedeas bond in the penalty of Five Hun-
dred :pollars, with surety deemed sufficient, and that the de-
fendant had due notice of the intention of the complainants 
to apply for such transcript. 
Witness my hand this 9th day of October, .1946. 
LUTHER LIBBY, JR., Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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